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Abstract. Various definitions of safety properties as sets of execution
traces have been introduced in the literature, some over finite traces,
others over infinite traces, yet others over both finite and infinite traces.
By employing cardinality arguments, this paper first shows that these
notions of safety are ultimately equivalent, by showing each of them
to have the cardinal of the continuum. It is then shown that all safety
properties can be characterized as “always past” properties, and then
that the problem of monitoring a safety property can be arbitrarily hard.
Finally, two decidable specification formalisms for safety properties are
discussed, namely extended regular expressions and past time LTL. It
is shown that monitoring the former requires non-elementary space. An
optimal monitor synthesis algorithm is given for the latter; the generated
monitors run in space linear with the number of temporal operators and
in time linear with the size of the formula.
1 Introduction
Informally, a safety property is a behavioral property on execution traces which,
once violated, cannot be satisfied anymore. For example, a property “always
x > 0” is violated when x ≤ 0 is observed for the first time; this safety property
remains violated even though eventually x > 0. That means that one can identify
each safety property with a set of “bad” finite execution traces, with the intuition
that once one of those is reached the safety property is violated.
There are several apparently different ways to formalize safety. Perhaps the
most immediate one is to complement the “bad traces” above and thus to define
a safety property as a prefix-closed property over finite traces (containing the
“good traces”) – by “property” in this paper we mean a set of finite or infinite
traces. Inspired by Lamport [19], Alpern and Schneider [4] define safety prop-
erties over infinite traces as ones with the property that if an infinite trace is
unacceptable then there must be some finite prefix of it which is already un-
acceptable, in the sense that there is no acceptable infinite completion of it.
Are these two definitions of safety equivalent? We show rather indirectly that
they are indeed equivalent, by showing that the corresponding sets of safety
properties have the cardinal c of the continuum (i.e., the cardinal of R, the set
of real numbers), so there must be some bijective mapping between the two.
Unfortunately, the existence of such a bijection is as little informative as the
existence of a bijection between R and R − Q. To capture the relationship be-
tween finite-trace and infinite-trace safety properties in a more meaningful way,
we introduce a subset of finite-trace safety properties that we call persistent,
and then construct an explicit bijection between that subset and the infinite-
trace safety properties. Interestingly, over finite traces there are as many safety
properties as unrestricted properties (finite-traces are enumerable and P(N) is
in bijection with R), while over infinite traces there are c safety properties versus
2c unrestricted properties (infinite traces are in bijection with R).
It is also common to define safety properties as properties over both finite
and infinite traces, the intuition for the finite traces being that of unfinished
computations. For example, Lamport [20] extends the notion of infinite-trace
safety properties to properties over both finite and infinite traces, while Schneider
et al. [27, 10] give an alternative definition of safety over finite and infinite traces,
called “execution monitoring”. One immediate technical advantage of allowing
both finite and infinite traces is that one can define prefix closed properties. We
indirectly show that prefix closeness is not a sufficient condition to define safety
properties when infinite traces are also allowed, by showing that there are 2c
prefix closed properties versus, as expected, “only” c safety properties.
Another common way to specify safety properties is as “always past” prop-
erties, that is, as properties containing only words whose finite prefixes satisfy
a given property. If P is a property on finite prefixes, then we write P for the
“always past P” corresponding safety property containing those words whose
prefixes are in P . We show that specifying safety properties as “always past”
properties is fully justified by showing that, for each of the three types of traces
(finite, infinite, and both), the “always past” properties are precisely the safety
properties as defined above. It is common to specify P using some logical formal-
ism, for example past time LTL [21]; for example, one can specify the property
“a before b” in past LTL as b→ · a, and “always a before b” as (b→ · a).
The problem of monitoring safety properties is also investigated in this paper.
Since there are as many safety properties as real numbers, it is not unexpected
that some of them can be very hard to monitor. We show that monitoring safety
properties can be arbitrarily hard by showing that it reduces to checking mem-
bership of natural numbers to sets of natural numbers. In particular, we can
associate to any degree in the arithmetic hierarchy as well as to any complexity
class in the decidable universe, a safety property whose monitoring is as hard as
that degree or complexity class.
In practice not all (c = |R|) safety properties are meaningful, but only those
(ℵ0 = |N|) which are specifiable using formal specification languages or log-
ics of interest. We also investigate the problem of monitoring safety properties
expressed using two common formalisms, namely regular expressions extended
with complement, also called extended regular expressions (ERE), and LTL. It
is known that both formalisms allow polynomial finite-trace membership check-
ing algorithms [13, 22] if one has random access to the trace, but that both
require exponential space if the trace can only be analyzed online [23, 16]. It is
also known that LTL can indeed be monitored in exponential space [9] and so
2
is claimed1 for EREs in [23]. We show that the claim in [23] is, unfortunately,
wrong, by showing that ERE monitoring requires non-elementary space. To do
so, we propose for any n ∈ N a safety property Pn whose monitoring requires
space non-elementary in n, as well as an ERE of size O(n3). Since the known
monitoring algorithms for LTL in its full generality are asymptotically optimal,
what is left to do is to consider important fragments of LTL. We focus on the
“always past” fragment and give a monitor synthesis algorithm that takes for-
mulae ϕ and generate monitors for them that need O(k) total space and O(|ϕ|)
time to process each event, where k is the number of past operators in ϕ. This
improves over the best known algorithm that needs space O(|ϕ| (and same time).
2 Preliminaries and Notations
We let N denote the set of natural numbers including 0 but excluding the infinity
symbol ∞ and let N∞ denote the set N ∪ {∞}. We also let Q denote the set
of rational numbers and R the set of real numbers; as for natural numbers, the
“∞” subscript can also be added to Q and R for the corresponding extensions
of these sets. Q+ and R+ denote the sets of strictly positive (0 not included)
rational and real numbers, respectively.
We fix a set Σ of elements called events or states. We call words in Σ?
finite traces and those in Σω infinite traces. If u ∈ Σ? ∪ Σω then ui is the i-th
state or event that appears in u. We call finite-trace properties sets P ⊆ Σ∗ of
finite traces, infinite-trace properties sets P ⊆ Σω of infinite traces, and just
properties sets P ⊆ Σ∗ ∪ Σω of finite or infinite traces. If the finite or infinite
aspect of traces is understood from context, then we may call any of the types
or properties above just properties. We may write P (w) for a property P and
a (finite or infinite) trace w whenever w ∈ P . Traces and properties are more
commonly called words and languages in the literature; we prefer to call them
traces and properties to better reflect the intuition that our target application
is monitoring and system observance, not formal languages. We take, however,
the liberty to also call them words and languages.
Let prefixes :Σ? → P(Σ?) be the prefix function returning for any finite
trace all its prefixes, and let prefixes :P(Σ?)→ P(Σ?) be its corresponding clo-
sure operator that takes sets of finite traces and closes them under prefixes. Note
that prefixes :P(Σ?) → P(Σ?) is indeed a closure operator, that is, it is exten-
sive (P ⊆ prefixes(P )), monotone (P ⊆ P ′ implies prefixes(P ) ⊆ prefixes(P ′)),
and idempotent (prefixes(prefixes(P )) = prefixes(P )). We overload the func-
tion prefixes to one that also returns the finite prefixes of infinite traces. Let
prefixes :Σω → P(Σ?) be the function returning for any infinite trace u all its
finite prefixes prefixes(u), and let prefixes :P(Σω)→ P(Σ?) be its corresponding
extension to sets of infinite traces.
In some cases states can be simply identified with their names, or labels,
and specifications of properties on traces may just refer to those labels. For
1 We thank Prasanna Thati for finding a subtle error in the proof in [23].
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example, the regular expression (s1 · s2)? specifies all those finite traces starting
with state s1 and in which states s1 and s2 alternate. In other cases, one can
think of states as sets of atomic predicates, that is, predicates that hold in
those states: if s is a state and a is an atomic predicate, then we say that a(s)
is true iff a “holds” in s; thus, if all it matters with respect to states is which
predicates hold and which do not hold in each state, then states can be faithfully
identified with sets of predicates. We prefer to stay loose with respect to what
“holds” means, because, depending on the context, it can mean anything. In
conventional software situations, atomic predicates can be: boolean expressions
over variables of the program, their satisfaction being decided by evaluating
them in the current state of the program; or whether a function is being called
or returned from; or whether a particular variable is being written to; or whether
a particular lock is being held by a particular thread; and so on. In the presence
of atomic predicates, specifications of properties on traces typically only refer to
the atomic predicates. For example, the property “always a before b”, that is,
those traces containing no state in which b holds that is not preceded by some
state in which a holds (for example, a can stand for “authentication” and b for
“resource access”), can be expressed in LTL as the formula (b→ · a).
Let us recall some basic notions and notations from formal languages, tem-
porarily using the consecrated terminology of “words” and “languages” instead
of traces and properties. For an alphabet Σ, let LΣ denote the set of languages
over Σ, i.e., the powerset P(Σ?). By abuse of language and notation, let ∅ de-
note the empty language {} and  the language containing only the empty word,
{}. If L1, L2 ∈ LΣ then L1 · L2 is the language {α1α2 | α1 ∈ L1 and α2 ∈ L2}.
note that L · ∅ = ∅ · L = ∅ and L ·  =  · L = L. If L ∈ LΣ then L? is
{α1α2 · · ·αn | n ≥ 0 and α1, α2, . . . , αn ∈ L} and ¬L is Σ? − L.
We next recall some notions related to cardinality. If A is any set, we let |A|
denote the cardinal of A, which expresses the size of A. When A is finite, |A| is
precisely the number of elements of A and we call it a finite cardinal. Infinite
sets can have different cardinals, called transfinite or even infinite. For example,
natural numbers N have the cardinal ℵ0 (pronounced “aleph zero”) and real
numbers R have the cardinal c, also called the cardinal of the continuum. Two
sets A and B are said to have the same cardinal, written |A| = |B|, iff there is
some bijective mapping between the two. We write |A| ≤ |B| iff there is some
injective mapping from A to B.
The famous Cantor-Bernstein-Schroeder theorem states that if |A| ≤ |B| and
|B| ≤ |A| then |A| = |B|. In other words, to show that there is some bijection
between sets A and B, it suffices to find an injection from A to B and an
injection fromB to A. The two injections need not be bijections. For example, the
inclusion of the interval (0, 1) in R+ is obviously an injection, so |(0, 1)| ≤ |R+|.
On the other hand, the function x  x/(2x + 1) from R+ to (0, 1) (in fact its
codomain is the interval (0, 1/2)) is also injective, so |R+| ≤ |(0, 1)|. Neither of
the two injective functions is bijective, yet by the Cantor-Bernstein-Schroeder
theorem there is some bijection between (0, 1) and R+, that is, |(0, 1)| = |R+|. We
will use this theorem to relate the various types of safety properties; for example,
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we will show that there is an injective function from safety properties over finite
traces to safety properties over infinite traces and another injective function in
the opposite direction. Unfortunately, the Cantor-Bernstein-Schroeder theorem
is existential: it only says that some bijection exists between the two sets, but
it does not give us an explicit bijection. Since the visualization of a concrete
bijection between different sets of safety properties can be very meaningful, we
will avoid using the Cantor-Bernstein-Schroeder theorem when we can find an
explicit bijection between two sets of safety properties.
If A is a set of cardinal α, then 2α is the cardinal of P(A), the power set
of A (the set of subsets of A). It is known that 2ℵ0 = c, that is, there are as
many sets of natural numbers as real numbers. The famous, still unanswered
continuum hypothesis, states that there is no set whose size is strictly between
ℵ0 and c; more generally, it states that, for any transfinite cardinal α, there is
no proper cardinal between α and 2α. If A and B are infinite sets, then |A|+ |B|
and |A| · |B| are the cardinals of the sets A ∪ B and A × B, respectively. An
important property of transfinite cardinals is that of absorption – the larger
cardinal absorbs the smaller one: if α and β are transfinite cardinals such that
α ≤ β, then α+ β = α · β = β; in particular, c · 2c = 2c. Besides sets of natural
numbers, there are several other important sets that have cardinal c: streams
(i.e., infinite sequences) of booleans, streams of reals, non-empty closed or open
intervals of reals, as well as the sets of all open or closed sets of reals, respectively.
For our purposes, if Σ is an enumerable set of states, then Σ? is also enumer-
able, so it has cardinal ℵ0. Also, if Σ is no denser than the set of real numbers,
in particular if it is finite, then Σω has the cardinal c, because it is equivalent
to streams of states. We can then immediately infer that the set of finite-trace
properties over Σ has cardinal 2ℵ0 = c, while the set of infinite-trace properties
has cardinal 2c.
3 Safety Properties
Intuitively, a safety property of a system is one stating that the system cannot
“go wrong”, or, as Lamport [19] put it, that the “bad thing” never happens.
In other words, in order for a system to violate a safety property, it should
eventually “go wrong” or the “bad thing” should eventually happen. There is
a very strong relationship between safety properties and runtime monitoring:
if a safety property is violated by a running system, then the violation should
happen during the execution of the system, in a finite amount of time, so a
monitor for that property observing the running system should be able to detect
the violation; an additional point in the favor of monitoring is that, if a system
violates a safety property at some moment during its execution, then there is no
way for the system to continue its execution to eventually satisfy the property, so
a monitor needs not wait for a better future once it detects a bad present/past.
State properties or assertions that need only the current state of the running
system to check whether they are violated or not, such as “no division by 0”, or
“x positive”, or no deadlock, are common safety properties; once violated, one
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can stop the computation or take corrective measures. However, there are also
interesting safety properties that involve more than one state of the system, such
as “if one uses resource x then one must have authenticated at some moment
in the past”, or “any start of a process must be followed by a stop within 10
units of time”, or “take command from user only if the user has logged in at
some moment in the past and has not logged out since then”, etc. Needless to
say that the atomic events, or states, which form execution traces on which
safety properties are defined, can be quite abstract: not all the details of a
system execution are relevant for the particular safety property of interest. In the
context of monitoring, these relevant events or states can be extracted by means
of appropriate instrumentation of the system. For example, runtime monitoring
systems such as Tracematches [3] and MOP [7] use aspect-oriented technology
to “hook” relevant observation points and appropriate event filters in a system.
It is customary to define safety properties as properties over infinite traces,
to capture the intuition that they are defined for systems that can potentially
run forever, such as reactive systems. A point in favor of infinite traces is that
finite traces can be regarded as special cases of infinite traces, namely ones that
“stutter” indefinitely in their last state (see, for example, Abadi and Lamport [1,
2]). Infinite traces are particularly desirable when one specifies safety properties
using formalisms that have infinite-trace semantics, such as linear temporal logics
or corresponding automata.
While “infinity” is a convenient abstraction that is relatively broadly-accepted
nowadays in mathematics and in theoretical foundations of computer science,
there is no evidence so far that a system can have an infinite-trace behavior (we
have not seen any). A disclaimer is in place here: we do not advocate finite-
traces as a foundations for safety properties; all we try to do is to argue that,
just because they can be seen as a special case of infinite traces, finite traces are
not entirely uninteresting. For example, an airplane engine has a finite life-span
and an obvious safety property for an airplane engine is precisely the one stating
that its behaviors should end with a unique “unsafe” state (most likely issued
by FAA). Also, a safety property associated to a one-time-access key issued to
a client can be “activate, then use at most once, then close”. Using regular pat-
terns over the alphabet of relevant events Σ = {activate, use, close}, this safety
property can be expressed as “activate · (+ use) · close”; any trace that is not a
prefix of the language of this regular expression violates the property, including
any other activation or use of the key after it was closed. While these finite-trace
safety properties can easily be expressed as infinite-trace safety properties, we
believe that that would be more artificial than simply accepting that in practice
we deal with many finite-trace safety properties.
In this section we discuss various approaches to formalize safety properties
and show that they are ultimately directly or indirectly equivalent. We catego-
rize them into finite-trace safety properties, infinite-trace safety properties, and
finite- and infinite-trace safety properties:
1. Section 3.1 defines safety properties over finite traces as prefix closed proper-
ties. A subset of finite-trace safety properties, that we call persistent, contain
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only traces that “have a future” within the property, that is, finite traces
that can be continued into other finite traces that are also in the safety
property. Persistent safety properties appear to be the right finite-trace vari-
ant that corresponds faithfully to the more conventional infinite-trace safety
properties. Even though persistent safety properties form a proper subset
of finite-trace safety properties and each finite-trace safety property has a
largest persistent safety property included in it, we show that there is in
fact a bijection between safety properties and persistent safety properties by
showing them both to have the cardinal of the continuum c.
2. In Section 3.2, we consider two standard infinite-trace definitions of a safety
property, one based on the intuition that violating behaviors must manifest
so after a finite number of events and the other based on the intuition of a
safety property as a closed set in an appropriate topology over infinite-traces.
We show them both equivalent to persistent safety properties over finite
traces, by constructing an explicit bijection (as opposed to using cardinality
arguments and infer the existence of a bijection); consequently, infinite-trace
safety properties also have the cardinal of the continuum c. Since closed sets
of real numbers are in a bijective correspondence with the real numbers, we
indirectly rediscover Alpern and Schneider’s result [4] stating that infinite-
trace safety properties correspond to closed sets in infinite-trace topology.
3. Section 3.3 considers safety properties defined over both finite and infinite
traces. We discuss two definitions of such safety properties encountered in
the literature, and, using cardinality arguments, we show their equivalence
with safety properties over only finite traces. In particular, safety properties
over finite and infinite traces also have the cardinality of the continuum c.
We also show that prefix-closeness is not a sufficient condition to character-
ize (not even bijectively) such safety properties, by showing that there are
significantly more (2c) prefix-closed properties over finite and infinite traces
than safety properties.
Therefore, each of the classes of safety properties is in bijection with the real
numbers. Since there are so many safety properties, we can also insightfully con-
clude that there is no enumerable mechanism to define all the safety properties,
because ℵ0  c. Therefore, particular logical or syntactic recursive formalisms
can only define some of the safety properties, but not all of them.
3.1 Safety Properties over Finite Traces
One of the most common intuitions for a safety property is as a prefix-closed
set of finite traces. This captures best the intuition that once something bad
happened, there is no way to recover: if w 6∈ P then there is no u such that P (wu),
which is equivalent to saying that if P (wu) then P (w), which is equivalent to
saying that P is prefix closed. From a monitoring perspective, a prefix closed
property can be regarded as one containing all the good (complete or partial)
behaviors of the observed system: once a state is encountered that does not form
a good behavior together with the previously observed states, then a violation
can be reported.
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Definition 1. Let Safety? be the set of finite-trace prefix-closed properties, that
is, the set {P ∈ P(Σ?) | P = prefixes(P )}. In other words, Safety? is the set of
fixed points of the prefix operator prefixes : P(Σ?)→ P(Σ?).
The star superscript in the notation Safety? reflects that its traces are finite;
in the next section we will define a set Safetyω of infinite-trace safety properties.
Since prefixes(P ) ∈ Safety? for any P ∈ P(Σ∗), we can assume from here on that
prefixes :P(Σ?)→ P(Σ?) is actually a function P(Σ∗)→ Safety?.
Example 1. Consider the one-time-access key safety property discussed above,
saying that a client can “activate, then use at most once, and then close” the key.
If Σ = {activate, use, close}, then this safety property can be expressed as the fi-
nite set of finite words {, activate, activate close, activate use, activate use close};
no other behavior is allowed. Now suppose that the safety policy is extended to
allow multiple uses of the key once activated, but still no further events once it
is closed. The extended safety property has now infinitely many finite-traces:
{} ∪ {activate} · {usen | n ∈ N} · {, close}.
Note that this property is indeed prefix-closed. A monitor in charge of online
checking this safety property would report a violation if the first event is not
activate, or if it encounters any second activate event, or if it encounters any
event after a close event is observed, including another close event.
It is interesting to note that this finite-trace safety property encompasses
both finite and infinite aspects. For example, it does not precludes behaviors in
which one sees an activate event and then an arbitrary number of use events;
use events can persist indefinitely after an activate event without violating the
property. On the other hand, once a close event is encountered, no other event
can be further seen. We will shortly see that the safety property above properly
includes the persistent safety property {} ∪ {activate usen | n ∈ N}, which
corresponds to the infinite-trace safety property {activate useω}.
While prefix closeness seems to be the right requirement for a safety property,
one can argue that it is not sufficient. For example, in the context of reactive
systems that supposedly run forever, one may think of a safety property as one
containing safe finite traces, that is, ones for which the reactive system can always
find a way to continue its execution safely. The definition of safety properties
above includes, among other safety properties, the empty set of traces as well
as all prefix-closed finite sets of finite traces; any reactive system will eventually
violate such safety properties, so one can say that the definition of safety property
above is too generous.
We next define persistent safety properties as ones that always allow a future;
intuitively, an observed reactive system that is in a safe state can always (if
persistent enough) find a way to continue its execution to a next safe state.
Definition 2. Let PersistentSafety? be the set of finite-trace persistent safety
properties, that is, safety properties P ∈ Safety? such that if P (w) for some
w ∈ Σ? then there is some a ∈ Σ such that P (wa).
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If a persistent safety property is non-empty, then note that it must contain an
infinity number of words. The persistency aspect of a finite-trace safety property
can be regarded, in some sense, as a liveness argument. Indeed, assuming that it
is a “good thing” for a trace to be indefinitely continued, then a persistent safety
property is one in which the “good thing” always eventually happens. If one takes
the liberty to regard “stuck” computations as unfair, then the persistency aspect
above can also be regarded as a fairness argument.
Another way to think of persistent safety properties is as a means to refer to
infinite behaviors by means of finite traces. This view is, in some sense, dual to
the more common approach to regard finite behaviors as infinite behaviors that
stutter infinitely in a “last” state (see, for example, Abadi and Lamport [1, 2]
for a formalization of such last-state infinite stuttering).
Note that if Σ is a degenerate set of events containing only one element,
that is, if |Σ| = 1, then |Safety?| = ℵ0 and |PersistentSafety?| = 1; indeed, if
Σ = {a} then Safety? contains precisely the properties a≤n = {ai | 0 ≤ i ≤ n}
for each n ∈ N and PersistentSafety? contains precisely one property, namely
{an | n ∈ N}. The case when there is only one event or state in Σ is neither
interesting nor practical. Therefore, from here on in this paper we take the liberty
to assume that |Σ| ≥ 2. Since in practice Σ contains states or events generate by
a computer, for simplicity in stating some of the subsequent results, we also take
the liberty to assume that |Σ| ≤ ℵ0; therefore, Σ can be any finite or recursively
enumerable set, including N, N∞, Q, etc., but cannot be R or any set “larger”
than R. With these assumptions, it follows that |Σ?| = ℵ0 (finite words are
recursively enumerable) and |Σω| = c (infinite streams have the cardinality of
the continuum).
Proposition 1. Safety? and PersistentSafety? are closed under union; Safety? is
also closed under intersection.
Proof. The union and the intersection of prefix-closed properties is also prefix-
closed. Also, the union of persistent prefix-closed properties is also persistent.
The intersection of persistent safety properties is not necessarily persistent:
Example 2. Let Σ be the set {0, 1}. Let P = {1m | m ∈ N} and P ′ = {} ∪
{10m | m ∈ N} be two persistent safety properties, where  is the empty word
(the word containing no letters). Then P ∩P ′ is the finite safety property {, 1},
which is not persistent. If one thinks that this happened because P ∩ P ′ does
not contain any proper (i.e., non-empty) persistent property, then one can take
instead the persistent safety properties P = {0n | n ∈ N} · {1m | m ∈ N} and
P ′ = {0n | n ∈ N}·({}∪{10m |m ∈ N}, whose intersection is the safety property
{0n | n ∈ N} ∪ {0n1 | n ∈ N}. This safety property is not persistent because
its words ending in 1 cannot persist, but it contains the proper persistent safety
property {0n | n ∈ N}.
Therefore, we can associate to any safety property in Safety? a largest per-
sistent safety property in PersistentSafety?, by simply taking the union of all
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persistent safety properties that are included in the original safety property (the
empty property is one of them, the smallest):
Definition 3. For a safety property P ∈ Safety?, let P ◦ ∈ PersistentSafety? be
the largest persistent safety property with P ◦ ⊆ P .
The following example shows that one may need to eliminate infinitely many
words from a safety property in order to obtain a persistent safety property:
Example 3. Let Σ = {0, 1} and let P be the safety property {0n | n ∈ N} ∪
{0n1 | n ∈ N}. Then P ◦ can contain no word ending with a 1 and can contain
all the words of 0’s. Therefore, P ◦ = {0n | n ∈ N}.
Finite safety properties obviously cannot contain any non-empty persistent
safety property, that is, P ◦ = ∅ if P is finite. But what if P is infinite? Is it always
the case that it contains a non-empty persistent safety property? Interestingly,
it turns out that this is true if and only if Σ is finite:
Proposition 2. If Σ is finite and P is a safety property containing infinitely
many words, then P ◦ 6= ∅.
Proof. For each letter a ∈ Σ, let us define the derivative of P wrt a, written
δa(P ), as the language {w ∈ Σ? | aw ∈ P}. Since
P = {} ∪
⋃
a∈Σ
{a} · δa(P )
since Σ is finite, and since P is infinite, it follows that there is some a1 ∈ Σ
such that δa1(P ) is infinite; note that a1 ∈ P since P is prefix closed. Similarly,
since δa1(P ) is infinite, there is some a2 ∈ Σ such that δa2(δa1(P )) is infinite
and a1a2 ∈ P . Iterating this reasoning, we can find some an ∈ Σ for each n ∈ N,
such that a1a2 . . . an ∈ P and δan(· · · (δa2(δa1(P ))) · · ·) is infinite, that is, the
set {w ∈ Σ? | a1a2 . . . anw ∈ P} is infinite. It is now easy to see that the set
{a1a2 . . . an | n ∈ N} ⊆ P is persistent. Therefore, P ◦ 6= ∅.
The following example shows that Σ must indeed be finite in order for the
result above to hold:
Example 4. Consider some infinite set of events or states Σ. Then we can label
distinct elements in Σ with distinct labels in N ∪ {∞}. We only need these
elements from Σ; therefore, without loss of generality, we can assume that Σ =
N ∪ {∞}. Let P be the safety property
{} ∪ {∞n (n− 1) . . . (m+ 1)m | 0 ≤ m ≤ n+ 1},
where  is the empty word (the word containing no letters) and (n + 1) . . . n is
also the empty word for any n ∈ N. Then P ◦ is the empty property. Indeed,
note that any persistent safety property P ′ included in P cannot have traces
ending in 0, because those cannot be continued into other traces in P ; since P ′
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cannot contain traces ending in 0, it cannot contain traces ending in 1 either,
because such traces can only be continued with a 0 letter into traces in P , but
those traces have already been decided that cannot be part of P ′; inductively,
one can show that P ′ can contain no words ending in letters that are natural
numbers in N. Since the only trace in P ending in ∞ is ∞ itself and since ∞
can only be continued with a natural number letter into a trace in P but such
trace cannot belong to P ′, we deduce that P ′ can contain no word with letters
in Σ. In particular, P ◦ must be empty.
Even though we know that the largest persistent safety property P ◦ included
into a safety property P always exists because PersistentSafety? is closed under
union, we would like to have a more constructive way to obtain it. A first and
obvious thing to do is to eliminate from P all the “stuck” computations, that is,
those which cannot be added any new state to obtain a trace that is also in P .
This removal step does not destroy the prefix-closeness of P , but it may reveal
new computations which are stuck. By iteratively eliminating all the computa-
tions that get stuck in a finite number of steps, one would expect to obtain a
persistent safety property, namely precisely P ◦. It turns out that this is indeed
true only if Σ is finite. If that is the case, then the following can also be used as
an alternative definition of P ◦:
Proposition 3. Given safety property P ∈ Safety?, then let P ◦ be the property
{w∈P | (∃a∈Σ)wa ∈ P}. Also, let {Pi | i ∈ N} be properties defined as P0 = P
and Pi+1 = P ◦i for all i ≥ 0. Then P ◦ =
⋂
i≥0 Pi whenever Σ is finite.
Proof. It is easy to see that if P is prefix-closed then P ◦ ⊆ P is also prefix-closed,
so P ◦ is also a property in Safety?. Therefore, the properties Pi form a sequence
P = P0 ⊇ P1 ⊇ P2 ⊇ · · · of increasingly smaller safety properties.
Let us first prove that
⋂
i≥0 Pi is a persistent safety property. Assume by
contradiction that for some w ∈ ⋂i≥0 Pn there is no a ∈ Σ such that wa ∈⋂
i≥0 Pi. In other words, we can find for each a ∈ Σ some ia ≥ 0 such that
wa 6∈ Pia . Since Σ is finite, we can let i be the largest among the natural
numbers ia ∈ N for all a ∈ Σ. Since Pi ⊆ Pia for all a ∈ Σ, it should be clear
that there is no a ∈ Σ such that wa ∈ Pi, which means that w 6∈ Pi+1. This
contradicts the fact that w ∈ ⋂i≥0 Pi. Therefore, ⋂i≥0 Pi ∈ PersistentSafety?.
Let us now prove that
⋂
i≥0 Pi is the largest persistent safety property in-
cluded in P . Let P ′ be any persistent safety property included in P . We show
by induction on i that P ′ ⊆ Pi for all i ∈ N. The base case, P ′ ⊆ P0, is obvious.
Suppose that P ′ ⊆ Pi for some i ∈ N and let w ∈ P ′. Since P ′ is persistent,
there is some a ∈ Σ such that wa ∈ P ′ ⊆ Pi, which means that w ∈ Pi+1. Since
w was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that P ′ ⊆ Pi+1. Therefore, P ′ ⊆
⋂
i≥0 Pi.
We next show that the finiteness of Σ was a necessary requirement in order
for the result above to hold. In other words, we show that if Σ is allowed to
be infinite then we can find a safety property P ∈ Safety? over Σ such that
P ◦ ∈ PersistentSafety? and ⋂i≥0 Pi ∈ Safety? are distinct. Since we showed in
the proof of Proposition 3 that any persistent safety property P ′ is included in
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⋂
i≥0 Pi, it follows that P
◦ ⊆ ⋂i≥0 Pi. Since P ◦ is the largest persistent safety




P ◦ 6= ⋂i≥0 Pi then ⋂i≥0 Pi cannot be persistent:
Example 5. Consider the safety property P over infinite Σ = N∪{∞} discussed
in Example 4, namely {} ∪ {∞n (n− 1) . . . (m+ 1)m | 0 ≤ m ≤ n+ 1}. Then
one can easily show by induction on i ∈ N that the properties Pi defined in
Proposition 3 are the sets {} ∪ {∞n (n − 1) . . . (m + 1)m | i ≤ m ≤ n + 1};
in other words, each Pi excludes from P all the words whose last letters are
smaller than i when regarded as natural numbers. Then the intersection
⋂
i≥0 Pi
contains no trace ending in a natural number; the only possibility left is then⋂
i≥0 Pi = {,∞}, which is different from P ◦ = ∅ (see Example 4).
One may argue that P ◦ 6= ⋂i≥0 Pi above happened precisely because P ◦ was
empty. One can instead pick the safety property Q = {0n | n ∈ N} · P . Then
one can show following the same idea as in Example 4 that Q◦ = {0n | n ∈ N}.
Further, one can show that Qi = {0n | n ∈ N} · Pi, so
⋂
i≥0Qi = {0n | n ∈
N} ∪ {0n∞ | n ∈ N}, which is different from Q◦.
Persistency is reminiscent of “feasibility” introduced by Apt et al. [5] in
the context of fairness, and of “machine closeness” introduced by Abadi and
Lamport [1, 2] (see also Schneider [26]) in the context of refinement. Let us use
the terminology “machine closeness”: a property L (typically a liveness or a
fairness property) is machine closed for a property M (typically given as the
language of some state machine) iff L does not prohibit any of the observable
runtime behaviors of M , that is, iff prefixes(M) = prefixes(M ∩ L); for example,
if M is the total property (i.e., every event is possible at any moment, i.e.,
M = Σ?) and L is the property stating that “always eventually event a”, then
any prefix of M can be continued to obtain a property satisfying L. Persistency
is related to machine closeness in that a safety property P is persistent if and
only if P ◦ is machine closed for P . In other words, there is nothing P can do in
a finite amount of time that P ◦ cannot do. However, there is a caveat here: since
liveness and fairness are inherently infinite-trace notions, machine closeness (or
feasibility) have been introduced in the context of infinite-traces. On the other
hand, persistency makes sense only in the context of finite traces.
It is clear that PersistentSafety? is properly included in Safety?. Yet, we next
show that, surprisingly, there is a bijective correspondence between Safety? and
PersistentSafety?, both having the cardinal of the continuum:
Theorem 1. |PersistentSafety?| = |Safety?| = c.
Proof. Since Σ? is recursively enumerable and since 2ℵ0 = c, we can readily infer
that |PersistentSafety?| ≤ |Safety?| ≤ |P(Σ?)| = c.
Let us now define an injective function ϕ from the open interval of real
numbers (0, 1) to PersistentSafety?. Since |Σ| ≥ 2, let us distinguish two different
elements in Σ and let us label them 0 and 1. For a real r ∈ (0, 1), let ϕ(r) be
the set {α | α ∈ {0, 1}? and 0.α < r}, where 0.α is the (rational) number in
(0, 1) whose decimals in binary representation are α, and where α is the word
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in Σ? corresponding to α. Note that the set ϕ(r) ∈ P(Σ?) is prefix-closed for
any r ∈ (0, 1), and that if w ∈ ϕ(r) then also w0 ∈ ϕ(r) (the latter holds since,
by real numbers conventions, 0.α = 0.α0), so ϕ(r) ∈ PersistentSafety?. Since
the set of rationals with finite number of decimals in binary representation is
dense in R and in particular in the interval (0, 1), it follows that the function
ϕ : (0, 1)→ PersistentSafety? is injective: indeed, if r1 6= r2 ∈ (0, 1), say r1 < r2,
then there is some α ∈ {0, 1}? such that r1 < 0.α < r2, so ϕ(r1) 6= ϕ(r2).
Since the interval (0, 1) has the cardinal of the continuum c, the existence of
the injective function ϕ implies that c ≤ |PersistentSafety?|. By the Cantor-
Bernstein-Schroeder theorem it follows that |PersistentSafety?| = |Safety?| = c.
The proof above could have been rearranged to avoid the need to use the set
PersistentSafety?. However, we prefer to keep it for two reasons:
1. For finite-traces, persistent safety properties appear to be more natural in
the context of reactive systems than just prefix closed properties;
2. Persistent safety properties play a technical bridge role in the next section
to show that the infinite-trace safety properties also have the cardinal c.
3.2 Safety Properties over Infinite Traces
The finite-trace safety properties defined above, persistent or not, rely on the
intuition of a correct prefix: a safety property is identified with the set of all its
finite prefixes. In the case of a persistent safety property, each “informal” infinite
acceptable behavior is captured by its infinite set of finite prefixes. Even though
persistent safety properties appear to capture well in a finite-trace setting the
intuition of safety in the context of (infinite-trace) reactive systems, one could
argue that it does not say anything about unacceptable infinite traces. Indeed,
one may think that persistent safety properties do not capture the intuition
that if an infinite trace is unacceptable then there must be some finite prefix of
it which is already unacceptable. In this section we show that there is in fact
a bijection between safety properties over infinite traces and persistent safety
properties over finite traces as we defined them in the previous section.
The definition of safety properties over infinite traces below appears to be the
most used definition of safety property in the literature; at our knowledge, it was
formally introduced by Alpern and Schneider [4], but they credit the insights of
their definition to Lamport [19]:
Definition 4. Let Safetyω be the set of infinite-trace properties Q ∈ P(Σω) s.t.:
if u 6∈ Q then there is a finite trace w ∈ prefixes(u) s.t. wv 6∈ Q for any v ∈ Σω.
In other words, if an infinite behavior violates the safety property then there
is some finite-trace “violation threshold”; once the violation threshold is reached,
there is no chance to recover.
The following proposition can serve as an alternative and more compact
definition of Safetyω:
Proposition 4. Safetyω = {Q ∈ P(Σω) | u ∈ Q iff prefixes(u) ⊆ prefixes(Q)}.
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Proof. Since u ∈ Q implies prefixes(u) ⊆ prefixes(Q), the only thing left to
show is that Q ∈ Safetyω iff “prefixes(u) ⊆ prefixes(Q) implies u ∈ Q”; the
latter is equivalent to “u 6∈ Q implies prefixes(u) 6⊆ prefixes(Q)”, which is further
equivalent to “u 6∈ Q implies there is some w ∈ prefixes(u) s.t. w 6∈ prefixes(Q)”,
which is indeed equivalent to Q ∈ Safetyω.
Another common intuition for safety properties over infinite traces is as closed
sets in the topology corresponding to Σω. Alpern and Schneider captured for-
mally this intuition for the first time in [4]; then it was used as a convenient
definition of safety by Abadi and Lamport [1, 2] among others:
Definition 5. An infinite sequence u(1), u(2), ..., of infinite traces in Σω con-
verges to u ∈ Σω, or u is a limit of u(1), u(2), ...,, written u = limi u(i), iff for all
m ≥ 0 there is an n ≥ 0 such that u(i)1 u(i)2 . . . u(i)m = u1u2 . . . um for all i ≥ n. If
Q ∈ P(Σω) then Q, the closure of Q, is the set {limi u(i) | u(i) ∈ Q for all i ∈ N}.
It can be easily shown that the “overline” closure above is indeed a closure
operator on Σω, that is, it is extensive (Q ⊆ Q), monotone (Q ⊆ Q′ implies
Q ⊆ Q′), and idempotent (Q = Q).
Definition 6. Let Safetyωlim be the set of properties {Q ∈ P(Σω) | Q = Q}.
As expected, the two infinite-trace safety property definitions are equivalent:
Proposition 5. Safetyωlim = Safety
ω.
Proof. All we need to prove is that for any Q ∈ P(Σω) and any u ∈ Σω,
prefixes(u) ⊆ prefixes(Q) iff u = limi u(i) for some infinite sequence of infinite
traces u(1), u(2). If prefixes(u) ⊆ prefixes(Q) then one can find for each i ≥
0 some u(i) ∈ Σω such that u1u2 . . . ui = u(i)1 u(i)2 . . . u(i)i , so for each m ≥ 0




2 . . . u
(i)
m for all i ≥ n, so
u = limi u(i). Conversely, if u = limi u(i) for some infinite sequence of infinite
traces u(1), u(2), ... in Σω, then for any m ≥ 0 there is some n ≥ 0 such that




2 . . . u
(n)
m , that is, for any prefix of u there is some u′ ∈ Q
having the same prefix, that is, prefixes(u) ⊆ prefixes(Q).
The next result establishes the relationship between infinite-trace and finite-
trace persistent safety properties, by proposing a concrete bijective mapping
relating the two (as opposed to using cardinality arguments to indirectly show
only the existence of such a mapping). Therefore, there is also a bijective corre-
spondence between safety properties over infinite traces and the real numbers:
Theorem 2. |Safetyω| = |PersistentSafety?| = c.
Proof. We show that there is a bijective function between the two sets of safety
properties. Note that prefixes(S) ∈ PersistentSafety? for any S ∈ P(Σω), so
prefixes is in fact a function P(Σω)→ PersistentSafety?. Let prefixes : Safetyω →
PersistentSafety? be the restriction of this prefix function to Safetyω; this function
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is well-defined because prefixes(S) ∈ PersistentSafety? for any S ∈ P(Σω). Let
us also define a function ω : PersistentSafety? → Safetyω as follows: ω(P ) =
{u ∈ Σω | prefixes(u) ⊆ P}. This function is well-defined: if u 6∈ ω(P ) then
by the definition of ω(P ) there is some w ∈ prefixes(u) such that w 6∈ P ; since
w ∈ prefixes(wv) for any v ∈ Σω, it follows that wv 6∈ ω(P ) for any v ∈ Σω.
We next show that prefixes and ω are inverse to each other. Let us first
show that prefixes(ω(P )) = P for any P ∈ PersistentSafety?. The inclusion
prefixes(ω(P )) ⊆ P follows by the definition of ω(P ): prefixes(u) ⊆ P for any
u ∈ ω(P ). The inclusion P ⊆ prefixes(ω(P )) follows from the fact that P is a
persistent safety property: for any w ∈ P one can iteratively build an infinite
sequence v1, v2, ..., such that wv1, wv1v2, ... ∈ P , so wv1v2... ∈ ω(P ). Let
us now show that ω(prefixes(Q)) = Q for any Q ∈ Safetyω. The inclusion Q ⊆
ω(prefixes(Q)) is immediate. For the other inclusion, let u ∈ ω(prefixes(Q)), that
is, prefixes(u) ⊆ prefixes(Q). Suppose by contradiction that u 6∈ Q. Then there
is some w ∈ prefixes(u) such that wv 6∈ Q for any v ∈ Σω. Since w ∈ prefixes(u)
and prefixes(u) ⊆ prefixes(Q), it follows that w ∈ prefixes(Q), that is, that there
is some u′ ∈ Q such that u′ = wv for some v ∈ Σω. This contradicts the fact
that wv 6∈ Q for any v ∈ Σω. Consequently, u ∈ Q.
The second part follows by Theorem 1.
3.3 Safety Properties over Finite and Infinite Traces
It is also common to define safety properties as properties over both finite and
infinite traces, the intuition for the finite traces being that of unfinished compu-
tations. For example, Lamport [20] extends the notion of safety in Definition 4
to properties over both finite and infinite traces, while Schneider et al [27, 10]
give an alternative definition of safety over finite and infinite traces. We define
both approaches shortly and then show their equivalence and their 1-to-1 corre-
spondence with real numbers. Before that, we argue that the mix of finite and
infinite traces is less trivial than it may appear, by showing that there are sig-
nificantly more prefix closed properties than in the case when only finite traces
were considered.
Definition 7. Let PrefixClosed?,ω be the set of prefix-closed sets of finite and
infinite traces: for Q ⊆ Σ? ∪Σω, Q ∈ PrefixClosed?,ω iff prefixes(Q) ⊆ Q. Also,
let PersistentPrefixClosed?,ω be the set of persistent prefix-closed sets of finite and
infinite traces: for Q ∈ PrefixClosed?,ω, Q ∈ PersistentPrefixClosed?,ω iff Q(w) for
some w ∈ Σ? implies that there is some a ∈ Σ such that Q(wa).
The next result says that there is a bijective correspondence between prefix-
closed and persistent prefix-closed properties also in the case of finite and infinite
traces, but that there are exponentially more such properties than in the case of
just finite traces:
Proposition 6. |PersistentPrefixClosed?,ω| = |PrefixClosed?,ω| = 2c.
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Proof. We show 2c ≤ |PersistentPrefixClosed?,ω| ≤ |PrefixClosed?,ω| ≤ 2c, where
the middle inequality is immediate. To show 2c ≤ |PersistentPrefixClosed?,ω|, let





where we assume for any real number in the interval (0, 1) its decimal binary
representation 0.α with α ∈ {0, 1}ω (if the number is rational then α may contain
infinitely many ending 0’s), and α is the infinite trace in Σω replacing each 0 and
1 in α by 0 and 1, respectively, where 0 and 1 are two arbitrary but fixed distinct
elements in Σ (recall that |Σ| ≥ 2. Note that ϕ(R) is well-defined: it is clearly
prefix-closed and it is also persistent because its finite traces are exactly prefixes
of infinite traces, so they admit continuations in ϕ(R). It is easy to see that ϕ
is injective. Since |(0, 1)| = c, we conclude that 2c ≤ |PersistentPrefixClosed?,ω|.
To show |PrefixClosed?,ω| ≤ 2c, note that any property in PrefixClosed?,ω is a
union of a subset in Σ? and a subset in Σω, so |PrefixClosed?,ω| ≤ 2|Σ?| · 2|Σω|.
Since |Σ?| = ℵ0, |Σω| = c, 2ℵ0 = c, and c · 2c = 2c (by absorption of transfinite
cardinals), we get that |PrefixClosed?,ω| ≤ 2c.
The fact that properties in PersistentPrefixClosed?,ω contain also infinite traces
was crucial in showing the injectivity of ϕ in the proof above. A similar construc-
tion for the finite trace setting does not work. Indeed, if one tries to define a func-
tion ϕ :P((0, 1))→ PersistentSafety? as ϕ(R) = ⋃0.α∈R prefixes(α), then one can
show it well-defined but cannot show it injective: e.g., ϕ((0, 0.5)) = ϕ((0, 0.5]).
Since safety properties over finite and infinite traces are governed by the
same intuitions as safety properties over only finite or over only infinite traces,
the result above tells us that prefix closeness is not a sufficient condition to
properly capture the safety properties. Schneider [27] proposes an additional
condition in the context of his EM (execution monitoring) framework, namely
that if an infinite trace is not in the property, then there is a finite prefix of it
which is not in the property either. It is easy to see that this additional condition
is equivalent to saying that an infinite trace is in the property whenever all its
finite prefixes are in the property, which allows us to compactly define safety
properties over finite and infinite traces in the EM style as follows:
Definition 8. Safety?,ωEM is the set {Q ⊆ Σ? ∪Σω | u ∈ Q iff prefixes(u) ⊆ Q}.
Note that Safety?,ωEM ⊂ PrefixClosed?,ω. We will shortly show that Safety?,ωEM is in
fact exponentially smaller than PrefixClosed?,ω, by showing that |Safety?,ωEM | = c.
The consecrated definition of a safety property in the context of both finite
and infinite traces is perhaps the one proposed by Lamport in [20], which relaxes
the one in Definition 4 by allowing u to range over both finite and infinite traces:
Definition 9. Let Safety?,ω be the set of finite- and infinite-trace properties
{Q ⊆ Σ? ∪Σω | u 6∈ Q⇒ (∃w ∈ prefixes(u)) (∀v ∈ Σ? ∪Σω) wv 6∈ Q}
Schneider informally stated in [27] that the two definitions of safety above
are equivalent. It is not hard to show it formally:
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Proposition 7. Safety?,ωEM = Safety
?,ω.
Proof. First note that Safety?,ω ⊆ PrefixClosed?,ω: if wu ∈ Q ∈ Safety?,ω and
w 6∈ Q then there is some w′ ∈ prefixes(w), say w = w′w′′, such that w′v 6∈ Q
for any v, in particular w′w′′u 6∈ Q, which contradicts wu ∈ Q.
Safety?,ω ⊆ Safety?,ωEM : let Q ∈ Safety?,ω and u ∈ Σ?∪Σω s.t. prefixes(u) ⊆ Q;
if u 6∈ Q then there is some w ∈ prefixes(u) s.t. wv 6∈ Q for any v, in particular
for v the empty word, that is, w 6∈ Q, which contradicts prefixes(u) ⊆ Q.
Safety?,ωEM ⊆ Safety?,ω: let u 6∈ Q ∈ Safety?,ωEM ; then prefixes(u) 6⊆ Q, that is,
there is some w ∈ prefixes(u) s.t. w 6∈ Q; since Q is prefix-closed, it follows that
wv 6∈ Q for any v ∈ Σ? ∪Σω.
We next show that there is a bijective correspondence between the safety
properties over finite or infinite traces above and the finite trace safety properties
in Section 3.1:
Theorem 3. |Safety?,ω| = |Safety?,ωEM | = |Safety?| = c.
Proof. Safety? ⊂ Safety?,ωEM since the properties in Safety?,ωEM are prefix-closed, so
|Safety?| ≤ |Safety?,ωEM |.
Since the functions prefixes :P(Σ?) → P(Σ?) and prefixes :P(Σω) → P(Σ?)
have actual co-domains Safety? and PersistentSafety?, respectively, they can be
organized as a function prefixes : Safety?,ωEM → Safety?. Let us show that this func-
tion is injective. Let us assume Q 6= Q′ ∈ Safety?,ωEM , say u ∈ Q and u 6∈ Q′, s.t.
prefixes(Q) = prefixes(Q′). Since u ∈ Q ∈ Safety?,ωEM it follows that prefixes(u) ⊆
prefixes(Q) ⊆ Q, which implies that prefixes(u) ⊆ prefixes(Q′) ⊆ Q′; since Q′ ∈
Safety?,ωEM , it follows that u ∈ Q′, contradiction. Therefore, prefixes : Safety?,ωEM →
Safety? is injective, which proves that Safety?,ωEM ≤ Safety?.
The rest follows by Proposition 7 and Theorem 1.
3.4 “Always Past” Characterization of Safety Properties
Another common way to specify safety properties is by giving an arbitrary prop-
erty on finite traces, not necessarily prefix closed, and then to require that any
acceptable behavior must have all its finite prefixes in the given property. A par-
ticularly frequent case is when one specifies the property of the finite-prefixes us-
ing the past-time fragment of linear temporal logics (LTL). For example, Manna
and Pnueli [21] call the resulting “always (past LTL)” properties safety formu-
lae; many other authors, including ourselves, adopted the terminology “safety
formula” from Manna and Pnueli, though some qualify it as “LTL safety for-
mula”. An example of an LTL safety formula is “always (b implies eventually in
the past a)”, written using LTL notation as “(b → · a)”; here the past time
formula “b→ · a” compactly specifies all the finite-traces
{wsw′s′ | w,w′ ∈ Σ?, s, s′ ∈ Σ, a(s) and b(s′) hold}⋃
{ws | w ∈ Σ?, s ∈ Σ, b(s) does not hold}.
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We will investigate the case when safety properties are expressed as LTL safety
formulae, as well as optimal monitoring techniques for such safety properties, in
Section 8. In the remaining of this section we assume that the past time prefix
properties are given as ordinary sets of finite-traces (so we make abstraction of
how these properties are expressed) and show not only that the resulting “always
past” properties are safety properties, but also that any safety properties can be
expressed as an “always past” property. This holds for all the variants of safety
properties (i.e., over finite traces, over infinite traces, or over both finite and
infinite traces).
Definition 10. Let P ⊆ Σ? be any property over finite traces. Then we define
the “always past” property P as follows:
(finite traces) {w ∈ Σ? | prefixes(w) ⊆ P}; and
(infinite traces) {u ∈ Σω | prefixes(u) ⊆ P}; and





 be the corresponding sets of properties.
In Section 8 we show that the language L(ϕ), that corresponds to the
LTL safety formula ϕ for ϕ some past-time LTL formula, is a property in
Safetyω. If one was interested in a finite-trace or in a both finite and infinite
trace semantics of LTL, then one could have shown that L(ϕ) ∈ Safety? or
that L(ϕ) ∈ Safety?,ω .
Intuitively, one can regard the square “” as a closure operator. Technically,
it is not precisely a closure operator because it does not operate on the same set:
it takes finite-trace properties to any of the three types of properties considered.
Since prefixes takes properties back to finite-trace properties, we can show the
following result saying that the square is a “closure operator via prefixes”, and
that safety properties are precisely the sets of words which are closed this way:
Proposition 8. The following hold for all three types of safety properties:
– (prefixes(P )) = P for any P ⊆ Σ?;
– Q is a safety property iff (prefixes(Q)) = Q.
Proof. ...
We next show that the “always past” properties are all safety properties
and, moreover, that any safety property can be expressed as an “always past”
property:
Theorem 4. The following hold:
– Safety? = Safety
?,
– Safetyω = Safety
ω, and
– Safety?,ω = Safety
?,ω.
Therefore, each of the “always past” safety properties have the cardinal c.
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Proof. We prove each of the equalities by double inclusion.
Safety? ⊆ Safety?. It is true because any property P in Safety? is prefix-close.
Safety? ⊆ Safety?. If P ∈ Safety? then we claim that P = P , so P ∈ Safety?.
Indeed, since P is prefix-close, prefixes(w) ⊆ P for any w ∈ P , so w ∈ P ;
also, since w ∈ prefixes(w), it follows that for any w ∈ P , w ∈ P .
Safetyω ⊆ Safetyω. Let P be an “always past” property in Safetyω, and let u be
an infinite trace inΣω such that u 6∈ P . Then it follows that prefixes(u) 6⊆ P ,
that is, there is some w ∈ prefixes(u) such that w 6∈ P . Since w ∈ prefixes(wv)
for any v ∈ Σω, it means that there is no v ∈ P such that prefixes(wv) ⊆ P ,
that is, there is no v ∈ Σω such that wv ∈ P . Therefore, P ∈ Safetyω.
Safetyω ⊆ Safetyω. If Q ∈ Safetyω then we claim that Q = prefixes(Q). The
inclusion Q ⊆ prefixes(Q) is clear, because u ∈ Q implies prefixes(u) ⊆
prefixes(Q). For the other inclusion, note that if prefixes(u) ⊆ prefixes(Q)
for some u ∈ Σω, then u must be in Q: if u 6∈ Q then by the definition of
Q ∈ Safetyω, there is some w ∈ prefixes(u) which cannot be completed into
an infinite trace in Q, which contradicts prefixes(u) ⊆ prefixes(Q).
Safety?,ω ⊆ Safety?,ω. By Proposition 7, it suffices to show that Safety?,ω ⊆
Safety?,ωEM . Let P be an “always past” property in Safety
?,ω
 , and let u ∈
Σ? ∪ Σω such that prefixes(u) ⊆ prefixes(P ). Since prefixes(P ) ⊆ P , it
follows that u ∈ P ; therefore, P ∈ Safety?,ωEM .
Safety?,ω ⊆ Safety?,ω . It is straightforward to see that Q ∈ Safety?,ωEM implies
Q = prefixes(Q).
The cardinality part follows by Theorems 1, 2, and 3.
Proposition 8 and Theorem 4 give yet another characterization for safety
properties over any of the three combinations of traces, namely one in the style
of the equivalent formulation of safety over infinite traces in Proposition 4: Q
is a safety property iff it contains precisely the words whose prefixes are in
prefixes(Q).
4 On Monitoring Safety Properties
safety properties are exactly the properties that can be monitored
persistent monitors = synchronous monitors
discuss pitfalls and principles, and then define the complexity of moni-
toring a safety property
show that monitoring of safety properties can be arbitrarily hard
4.1 Specifying Safety Properties as Monitors
Safety properties are difficult to work with as flat sets of finite or infinite words,
not only because they can contain infinitely many words, but also because such
a flat representation is inconvenient for further analysis. It is important there-
fore to specify safety properties using formalisms that are easier to represent
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and reason about. The next sections in this paper investigate several dedicated
formalisms that proved to be convenient in specifying safety, such as finite state
machines, regular expressions and temporal logics, together with corresponding
limitations and efficient monitor synthesis techniques. In this section we formal-
ize the intuitive notion of a monitor as a special state machine and give yet
another characterization of safety properties, namely as monitorable properties.
Since monitorable properties are completely defined by their monitors, it follows
that all safety properties can be specified by their corresponding monitors.
Recall that we work under the assumption thatΣ is a set of events or program
states such that |Σ| ≤ ℵ0.
Definition 11. A Σ-monitor, or just a monitor (when Σ is understood), is a
triple M = (S, s0,M :S × Σ ⇁ S), where S is a set of states, s0 ∈ S is the
initial state, and M is a deterministic partial transition function.
Therefore, a monitor as defined above is nothing but a deterministic state
machine without final states. One could have defined monitors to be precisely
standard state machines, but the subsequent technical developments would have
been slightly more involved. In fact, we aim at shortly giving an even more com-
pact definition of a monitor, that we will call canonical monitor, which appears
to be sufficient to capture any safety property. The intuition for a monitor is the
expected one: the monitor is driven by events generated by the observed pro-
gram (the letters in Σ) – each newly received event drives the monitor from its
current state to some other state, as indicated by the transition function M ; if
the monitor ever gets stuck, that is, if the transition function M is undefined on
the current state and the current event, then the monitored property is declared
violated at that point by the monitor.
For any partial function M :S × Σ ⇁ S, we obey the following common
notational convention. If s ∈ S and w = w1w2 . . . wk ∈ Σ?, we write “M(s, w) ↓”
whenever M(s, w) is defined, that is, whenever M(s, w1) and M(M(s, w1), w2)
and ... and M(...(M(s, w1), w2)..., wk) are all defined, which is nothing but only
saying that M(...(M(s, w1), w2)..., wk) is defined. If we write M(s, w) = s′ for
some s′ ∈ S, then, as expected, we mean that M(...(M(s, w1), w2)..., wk) is
defined and equal to s′.
A monitor specifies a finite-trace property, an infinite-trace property, as well
as a finite- and infinite-trace property:
Definition 12. Given a monitor M = (S, s0,M :S × Σ ⇁ S), we define the
following properties:
– L?(M) = {w ∈ Σ? | M(s0, w) ↓},
– Lω(M) = {u ∈ Σω | M(s0, w) ↓ for all w ∈ prefixes(u)}, and
– L?,ω(M) = L?(M) ∪ Lω(M).
We call L?(M) the finite-trace property specified byM, call Lω(M) the infinite-
trace property specified by M, and call L?,ω(M) the finite- and infinite-trace
property specified by M.
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Proposition 9. For any monitor M, the following hold:
– L?(M) ∈ Safety?,
– Lω(M) ∈ Safetyω,
– L?,ω(M) ∈ Safety?,ω, and
Proof. They all follow by Theorem 4: taking P in Definition 10 to be the prop-
erty {w ∈ Σ? | M(s0, w) ↓}, then P over finite traces is precisely L?(M),
over infinite traces is precisely Lω(M), and over finite and infinite traces is pre-
cisely L?,ω(M), so the three languages are in Safety?, Safetyω, and Safety?,ω ,
respectively.
Definition 13. For a property P ⊆ Σ? ∪ Σω, we let Monitors(P ) be the set of
monitors {M | L?,ω(M) = P}. If Monitors(P ) 6= ∅ then P is called monitorable
and the elements of Monitors(P ) are called monitors of P . We define the following
classes of properties:
– Monitorable? = {P ⊆ Σ? | P monitorable},
– Monitorableω = {P ⊆ Σω | P monitorable}, and
– Monitorable?,ω = {P ⊆ Σ? ∪Σω | P monitorable}.
we don’t require that M should be decidable; for example, it can be an
oracle, or, in the context of social domains, a commitee deciding/voting
whether to let it go or not
Definition 14. A canonical Σ-monitor is a partial function N :N × Σ ⇁ N.
Let SN = {n | (∃w)N (0, w) = n} be the states of N . As before, let
– L?(N ) = {w ∈ Σ? | N (0, w) ↓},
– Lω(N ) = {u ∈ Σω | N (0, w) ↓ for all w ∈ prefixes(u)}, and
– L?,ω(N ) = L?(N ) ∪ Lω(N ).
Proposition 10. A property P ⊆ Σ? ∪ Σω is monitorable iff there is some
canonical monitor N such that P = L?,ω(N ).
Proof. ...
Definition 15. A canonical monitor K :N×Σ ⇁ N is persistent iff for any s ∈
SK, there is an a ∈ Σ such that K(s, a) ↓. Let PersistentMonitorable? be the set of
finite-trace properties monitorable by persistent monitors, {L?(K) | K persistent}.
Definition 16. If N1,N2 :N × Σ ⇁ N are monitors, then let N1 v N2 iff for
any s ∈ N and any a ∈ Σ, if N1(s, a) defined then N2(s, a) also defined and
N2(s, a) = N1(s, a).
Proposition 11. ({K | K v N and K persistent},v) is a complete lattice for
any canonical monitor N .
Proof. ...
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Definition 17. For any canonical monitor N , let N ◦ be the v-maximal element
of the complete lattice ({K | K v N and K persistent},v).
Proposition 12. The following hold for any canonical monitor N :
– Lω(N ) = Lω(N ◦),
– L?(N ◦) = L?(N )◦, and
– N persistent iff L?(N ) persistent.
Proof. ...
Theorem 5. The following hold:
– Monitorable? = Safety?,
– PersistentMonitorable? = PersistentSafety?,
– Monitorableω = Safetyω, and
– Monitorable?,ω = Safety?,ω.
Proof. ...
Definition 18. A canonical monitor N such that prefixes(Lω(N )) = L?(N ) is
called synchronous.
Proposition 13. A monitor is synchronous iff it is persistent.
Proof. ...
4.2 The Complexity of Monitoring a Safety Property
We here address the problem of defining the complexity of monitoring. Before we
give our definition, let us first discuss some pitfalls in defining this notion. Our
definition for the complexity of monitoring resulted as a consequence of trying
to avoid these pitfalls. Let P be a safety property.
Pitfall 1.
The complexity of monitoring P is nothing but the complexity of check-
ing, for an input word w ∈ Σ?, whether w ∈ prefixes(P ).
This would be an easy to formulate decision problem, but, unfortunately, does
not capture well the intuition of monitoring, because it does not require that
the word w be processed incrementally, as its letters become available from the
observed system. Incremental processing of letters can make a huge difference
in both how complex monitoring is and how monitoring complexity can be de-
fined. For example, it is well-known that the membership problem of a finite
word to the language of an extended regular expression (ERE), i.e., a regular
expression extended with complement operators, is a polynomial problem (the
classic algorithm by Hopcroft and Ullman [13] runs in space O(m2 ·n) and time
O(m3 ·n), where m is the size of the word and n that of the expression). However,
as shown in Section 6, there are EREs defining safety properties whose moni-
toring requires non-elementary space and time. Of course, this non-elementary
lower-bound is expressed only as a function of the size of the ERE representing
the safety property; it does not take into account the size of the monitored trace.
This leads us to our first guiding principle:
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Principle 1.
The complexity of monitoring a safety property P should depend only upon
P , not upon the trace being monitored.
Indeed, since monitoring is a process that involves potentially unbounded traces,
if the complexity of monitoring a property P were expressed as a function of the
execution trace as well, then that complexity measure would be close to mean-
ingless in practice, because monitoring reactive systems would have unbounded
complexity. For example, consider an operating system monitoring some safety
property on how its resources are being used by the various running processes;
what one would like to know here is what is the runtime overhead of monitoring
that safety property at each relevant event, and not the obvious fact that the
more the operating system runs the larger the total runtime overhead is.
Nevertheless, one can admitedly argue that it would still be useful to know
how complex the monitoring of P against a given finite trace w is, in terms of
both the size of (some representation of) P and the size of w; however, this is
nothing but a conventional membership test decision problem, that has nothing
to do with monitoring. If one picks some arbitrary off-the-shelf efficient algorithm
for membership testing and uses that at each newly received event on the existing
finite execution trace, then one may obtain a “monitoring” algorithm whose
complexity to process each event grows in time, as events are processed. In
the context of monitoring a reactive system, that means that eventually the
monitoring process may become unfeasible, regardless of how many resources
are initially available and regardless of how efficient the membership testing
algorithm is. What one needs in order for the monitoring process to stay feasible
regardless of how many events are observed, is a special membership algorithm
that processes each event as received and whose state or processing time does
not increase potentially unbounded as events are received. Therefore, one needs
an algorithm which, if it takes resources R to check w, then it takes at most
R+∆ to check a one-event continuation wa of w, where ∆ does not deppend on
w. In other words, one needs a monitor for P of complexity ∆.
Pitfall 2.
P is typically infinite, so the complexity of monitoring P should be a
function of the size of some finite specification, or representation, of P .
Indeed, since Principle 1 tells us that the complexity of monitoring P is a function
of P only and not of the monitored trace, one may be tempted to conclude that
it is a function of the size of some convenient encoding of P . There are at least
two problems with this approach, that we discuss below.
– One problem is that the same property P can be specified many different
ways as a structure of finite size; for example, it can be specified as a regular
expression, as an extended regular expression, as a temporal logic formula, as
an ordinary automaton, as a push-down automaton, etc. These formalisms
may represent P as specifications of quite different sizes. Which is the most
appropriate? It is, nevertheless, interesting and important to study the com-
plexity of monitoring safety properties expressed using different specification
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formalisms, as a function of the property representation size, because that
can give us an idea of the amount of resources needed to monitor a particu-
lar specification; the rest of the paper is, in fact, dedicated to this problem.
However, one should be aware that such a complexity measure is an at-
tribute of the corresponding specification formalisms, not of the specified
property itself. Indeed, the higher this complexity measure for a particular
formalism, the higher the encoding strength of safety properties in that for-
malism: for example, as shown in Section 6, the complexity of monitoring
safety properties expressed as EREs is non-elementary in the size of the orig-
inal ERE, while the complexity of monitoring the same property expressed
as an ordinary regular expression is linear in the size of the regular expres-
sion. Does that mean that one can monitor safety properties expressed as
regular expressions non-elementarily more efficiently than one can monitor
safety properties expressed as EREs? Of course not, because EREs and reg-
ular expressions have the same expressivity, so they specify exactly the same
safety properties. All it means is that EREs can express safety-properties
non-elementarily more compactly than ordinary regular expressions.
– Another problem with this approach is that apparently appropriate repre-
sentations of P may be significantly larger than it takes to monitor P . One
may say, for example, that, whenever possible, a natural way to specify a
particular safety property is as a finite-state machine, e.g., as a monitor like
in Definition 11 . To be more concrete, consider that the safety property Pn
saying “every 2n-th event is a” is specified as a monitor of 2n states that
transits with any event from each state to the next one, except for the 2n-th
state, which has only one transition, with event a, back to state 1. There-
fore, the size of this representation of Pn is Ω(2n). Assuming that each state
takes n bits of storage (for example, assume that states are exactly the binary
encodings of the numbers 1, 2, 3, ..., 2n) and that the next state can be cal-
culated from the current state in linear complexity with the size of the state
(which is true in our scenario), then it is clear that the actual complexity of
monitoring Pn is O(n). If the complexity of monitoring Pn were a function
of the size of the specification of Pn, then one could wrongly conclude that
the complexity of monitoring “every 2n-th event is a” is O(log n).
Therefore, a safety property P has an inherent complexity w.r.t. monitoring,
complexity which has nothing to do with how P is represented, or encoded, or
specified. It is that inherent complexity attribute of safety properties that we
are after here. From the discussion above, we draw our second guiding principle:
Principle 2.
The complexity of monitoring a safety property P is an attribute of P alone,
not a function of the size of some adhoc representation of P .
By Theorem 5, safety properties are precisely those properties that are moni-
torable, that is, those properties P for which there are (finite-state or not) moni-
torsM = (S, s0,M :S×Σ ⇁ S) whose (finite-trace, infinite-trace, or finite- and
infinite-trace – this depends upon the type of P ) language is precisely P . Any
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algorithm, program or system that one may come up with to be used as a moni-
tor for P , can be organized as a monitor of the formM = (S, s0,M :S×Σ ⇁ S)
for P . Consequently, the complexity of monitoring P cannot be smaller than the
functional complexity of the partial function M :S × Σ ⇁ S) corresponding to
some “best” monitor M for P ; if there are no additional restrictions, then by
“best” monitor we mean the one whose functional complexity of M is small-
est. In particular, if there is no monitor for P whose transition partial function
M is decidable, then we can safety say that the problem of monitoring P is
undecidable. This discussion leads to the following:
Pitfall 3.
The complexity of monitoring P is the functional complexity of function
M , where M = (S, s0,M :S ×Σ ⇁ S) is the “best” monitor for P .
Since safety properties are precisely the monitorable properties, this appears
to be a very natural definition for the complexity of monitoring. While the
functional complexity of the monitor function is indeed important because it
directly influences the efficiency of monitoring, it is not a sufficient measure
for the complexity of monitoring. That is because the functional complexity of
M only says how complex M is in terms of the size of its input; it does not say
anything about how large the state of the monitor can grow in time. For example,
in Section 6 we recall a rewriting-based monitoring algorithm for EREs from
[23], whose states are EREs and whose transition is a derivative operation of
functional complexity O(n2) taking an ERE of size n into an ERE of size O(n2).
It would be very misleading to say that the complexity of monitoring EREs
is O(n2), because it may sound much better than it actually is: the n2 factor
accumulates as events are processed. As shown in Section 6, any monitor for
EREs, including the one based on derivatives, eventually requires non-elementary
resources (in the size of the ERE) to process a new event.
Therefore, while the complexity of the function M being executed at each
newly received event by a monitor M is definitely a necessary and important
factor to be considered when defining the complexity of monitoring usingM, it
is not sufficient. One also needs to take into account the size of the input that
is being passed to the monitoring function, that is, the size of the monitor state
together with the size of the received event. In particular, a monitor storing all
the observed trace has unbounded complexity, say∞, even though its monitoring
function has trivial complexity (e.g., the “event storing” function has linear
complexity). More generally, if a property admits no finite-state monitor, than
we’d like to say that its monitoring complexity is∞: indeed, for any monitor for
such a property and for any amount of resources R, there is some sequence of
events that would lead the monitor to a state that needs more than R resources
to be stored or computed. These observations lead us to the following:
Principle 3. The complexity of monitoring P is a function of both the
functional complexity of M and of the size of the states in S, where M =
(S, s0,M :S ×Σ ⇁ S) is an appropriately chosen (“best”) monitor for P .
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We next follow the three principles above and derive our definition for the
complexity of monitoring a safety property P . Before that, let us first define the
complexity of monitoring a safety property using a particular monitor for that
property, or in other words, let us first define the complexity of a monitor.
During a monitoring session using a monitor, at any moment in time one
needs to store at least one state, namely the state that the monitor is currently
in. When receiving a new event, the monitor launches its transition function on
the current state and the received input. Therefore, the (worst-case) complexity
of monitoring with M = (S, s0,M :S ×Σ ⇁ S) could be defined as
max{FC(M(s, a)) | s ∈ S, a ∈ Σ},
where FC(M(s, a)) is the functional complexity of evaluating M on state s and
event a, as a function of the sizes of s and a. In other words, the worst-case mon-
itoring complexity of a particular monitor is the maximal functional complexity
that its transition function has on any state and any input; this functional com-
plexity is expressed as a function of the size of the pair (state,event). In order for
such a definition to make sense formally, one would need to define or axiomatize
the size of monitor states and the size of events.
Definition 19. Given a monitor M = (S, s0,M :S × Σ ⇁ S), we define the
complexity of monitoring M, written CMon(M), as the function
FC(M)(log |S|) : N→ N,
which is the “uncurried” version applied on log |S| of the worst-case functional
complexity FC(M) : N × N → N of the partial function M as a function of the
size of the pair (state,event) being passed to it.
we assume that the complexity of monitoring a safety property P is the
worst-case complexity of monitoring it using some appropriate, “best” monitor
for P .
a safety property P would be
min{max{FC(M(s, a)) | s ∈ S, a ∈ Σ} | M = (S, s0,M) ∈ Monitors(P )},
where FC(M(s, a)) is the functional complexity of evaluating M on state s and
event a, as a function of the sizes of s and a. In other words, we assume that
the complexity of monitoring a safety property P is the worst-case complexity
of monitoring it using some appropriate, “best” monitor for P . The worst-case
monitoring complexity of a particular monitor is the maximal functional com-
plexity that its transition function has on any state and any input; this functional
complexity is expressed as a function of the size of the pair (state,event). There-
fore, in order for such a definition to make sense formally, one would need to
define or axiomatize the size of monitor states and the size of events.
Since in order to distinguish N elements one needs log(N) space, we deduce
that one needs at least log(|SM |) space to store the state of the monitor in its
worst-case monitoring scenario (recall that each state in SM is reachable).
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Definition 20. We define the complexity of monitoring a safety property P ,
written CMon(P ), as the
min{FC(M) ◦ 〈log(|S|), 1Σ〉 | M = (S, s0,M) ∈ Monitors(P )}
4.3 Monitoring Safety Properties is Arbitrarily Hard
We show that the problem of monitoring a safety property can be arbitrarily
complex. The previous section tells us that there are as many safety properties as
real numbers. Therefore, it is not surprising that some of them can be very hard
or impossible to monitor. In this section we formalize this intuitive argument.
Our approach is to show that we can associate a safety property PS to any set
of natural numbers S, such that monitoring that safety property is as hard as
checking membership of arbitrary natural numbers to S. The result then follows
from the fact that checking memberships of natural numbers to sets of natural
numbers is a problem that can be arbitrarily complex.
Theorem 1 indirectly says that we can associate a persistent safety prop-
erty to any set of natural numbers (sets of natural numbers are in a bijective
correspondence with the real numbers). However, it is not clear how that safety
property looks and neither how to monitor it. We next give a more concrete map-
ping from sets of natural numbers to (persistent) safety properties and show that
monitoring the property is equivalent to testing membership to the set. It suffices
to assume that Σ contains only two elements, say Σ = {0, 1}.
Definition 21. Let P :P(N) → PersistentSafety? be the mapping defined as
follows: for any S ⊆ N, let PS be the set 1? ∪ {1k0 | k ∈ S} · {0, 1}?.
It is easy to see that PS is a persistent safety property over finite traces.
Also, it is easy to see that the bijection in the proof of theorem 2 associates to
PS the safety property over infinite traces 1ω ∪ {1k0 | k ∈ S} · {0, 1}ω.
Let us now investigate the problem of monitoring PS .
Proposition 14. For any S ⊆ N, monitoring PS is equivalent to deciding mem-
bership of natural numbers to S.
Proof. If MS is an oracle deciding membership of natural numbers to S, that is,
if MS(n) is true iff n ∈ S, then one can build a monitor for PS as follows: for
a given trace, incrementally read and count the number of prefix 1’s; if no 0 is
ever observed then monitor indefinitely without reporting any violation; when a
first 0 is observed, if any, ask if M(k), where k is the number of 1’s observed; if
M(k) is false, then report violation; if M(k) is true, then continue monitoring
indefinitely and never report violation. It is clear that this is indeed an online
monitor for PS .
Conversely, if we had any monitor for PS then we could build a decision
procedure for membership to S as follows: given k ∈ N, send to the monitor a
sequence of k ones followed by a 0; if the monitor reports violation then deduce
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that k 6∈ S; if the monitor does not report violation, then deduce that k ∈ S. It
is clear that this is a decision procedure for membership to S.
The proof works for both persistent safety properties over finite traces and
for safety properties over infinite traces.
The claim in the title of this section follows now from the fact that the set S
of natural numbers can be chosen so that its membership problem is arbitrarily
complex. For example, since there are as many subsets of natural numbers as real
numbers while there are only as many Turing machines as natural numbers, it
follows that there are many (exponentially) more sets of natural numbers that are
not recognized by Turing machines than those that are. In particular, there are
sets of natural numbers corresponding to any degree in the arithmetic hierarchy,
i.e., to predicates A(k) of the form (Q1k1)(Q2k2) · · · (Qnkn) R(k, k1, k2, · · · , kn),
where Q1, Q2, ..., Qn are alternating (universal or existential) quantifiers and
R is a recursive/decidable relation: for A such a predicate, let SA be the set of
natural numbers {k | A(k)}. Recall that if Q1 is ∀ then A is called a Πn property,
while if Q1 is ∃ then A is called a Σn property. In particular, Σ0 = Π0 and they
contain precisely the recursive/decidable properties, Σ1 contains precisely the
class of recursively enumerable problems, Π1 contains precisely the co-recursively
enumerable problems, etc.; a standard Π2 problem is TOTALITY: given k ∈ N,
is it true that Turing machine with Go¨del number k terminates on all inputs?
Since each level in the arithmetic hierarchy contains problems strictly harder
than problems on the previous layer (because Σn ∪ Πn ( Σn+1 ∩ Πn+1), the
arithmetic hierarchy gives us a universe of safety properties whose monitoring
can be arbitrarily hard.
Within the decidable fragment, as expected, monitoring safety properties can
also have any complexity. Indeed, pick for example any NP-complete problem
and let S be the set of inputs (coded as natural numbers) for which the problem
has a positive answer; then, as explained in the proof of Proposition 14, mon-
itoring PS against input 1k0 is equivalent to deciding membership of k to S,
which is further equivalent to answering the NP-complete problem on input k.
Of course, in practice a particular (implementation of a) monitor can be more
complex than the corresponding membership problem; for example, monitors
corresponding to NP-complete problems are most likely exponential. Also, note
that a monitor for PS needs not necessarily do its complex computation on an
input 1k0 when it encounters the 0. It can perform intermediate computations
as it reads the prefix 1’s and thus pay a lesser computational price when the 0
is encountered. What Proposition 14 says is that the total complexity to process
the input 1k0 can be no lower than the complexity of checking whether k ∈ S.
5 Monitoring FSM Safety Properties
...
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6 Monitoring ERE Safety Needs Non-Elementary Space
Extended regular expressions (EREs) add complementation (¬) to regular ex-
pressions (REs). Complementation can be handy when defining safety proper-
ties, because it allows one to say both what should never happen as well as what
could happen. In particular, in the context of monitoring EREs, one can switch
between the expression of bad prefixes of a safety property and that of good
prefixes by just applying a complement operator.
In this section we show that any monitor for safety properties expressed as
EREs requires non-elementary space. More precisely, for a given n ∈ N, we build
an ERE of size O(n3) such that its language is prefix closed and any monitor
for its language requires 22
··2
n
space, with n nested power of 2 operations.
6.1 Discussion and Relevance of the Lower-Bound Result
Since regular expressions (REs) and deterministic (DFA) and non-deterministic
(NFA) finite-state automata are enumerable structures while the set of safety
properties is in bijection with the set of real numbers, there are many safety prop-
erties that cannot be expressed using REs or automata (or any other formalism
whose objects are enumerable). Nevertheless, there are many safety properties of
interest that can be expressed as REs or automata. Safety properties over finite
or infinite traces can be expressed as REs in at least two different ways:
1. Use an RE to express the language of its bad prefixes; or
2. Use an RE to express the language of its good prefixes.
In the first case, the RE captures the finite-trace behaviors that should never
happen, while in the second the RE captures the ones that could possibly happen.
Obviously, not all REs correspond to safety properties in one or the other
of the two cases above. For example, the RE (0 · 1)+ cannot express the bad
prefixes of a safety property, because “01” is a bad prefix while “010” is not. In
order for an RE to express the bad prefixes of a safety property, it should have
the property that once w is in its language, then all ww′ for any w′ should also
be in its language. The RE (0 · 1)+ cannot express the good prefixes of a safety
property either: “0101” is a good prefix while 010 is not. The language of an RE
must be prefix closed in order to express the good prefixes of a safety property.
In both cases above, monitoring the safety property can be done very effi-
ciently (linearly in the size of the RE, both space-wise and time-wise) by first
translating its corresponding RE into an NFA, for example using a technique
such as Thompson’s [30], and then doing one of the following:
1. In the first case, simulate the NFA-to-DFA construction on the fly as events
are received. The state of the monitor is therefore a set of states of the NFA.
At start, that set contains only the initial state of the NFA. For each new
event, construct the next set by collecting all the NFA states that can be
reached via the received event from any of the existing states in the set. If a
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final state is reached then report violation of the property: bad prefix found.
Since the final states in the NFA symbolize the reach of a bad prefix and
since bad prefixes have “no future” in a safety property, the NFA associated
to the original RA can be optimized (in case it is not already optimal directly
from its construction) by removing any edges out of its final states.
2. In the second case, the monitor works the same way as in the first case,
but checking at each time that the monitor state (also a set of NFA states)
contains at least one final state of the NFA; if that is not the case, then
report violation: prefix found which is not good. If one is willing to pay the
exponential price and determinize the NFA of good prefixes, then one can
further optimize the resulting DFA (in case it is not already optimized by
construction) by collapsing all its non-final states into a “dead-end” state:
indeed, the reachability of a non-final state signifies the reachability of a bad
prefix, which has “no future”. It is not clear whether or how to optimize the
NFA of good prefixes using the additional info that it is a safety property.
Extended regular expressions (EREs) add complementation (¬) to REs.
Meyer and Stockmeyer [29, 28] showed that EREs can express languages non-
elementarily more compactly than REs. In other words, for any constant k ≥ 1,
one can find EREs of large enough size n ∈ N for which there is no RE having the
same language of size less than 22
..
2n
, with k nested power operations. Meyer
and Stockmeyer [29, 28] showed that several other problems concerning EREs
are also non-elementary, including: the equivalence of EREs, the emptiness of
the language of an ERE (and implicitly the emptiness of the complement of the
language of an ERE), the automata generation (NFA or DFA) from an ERE,
etc. Note that it is straightforward to generate potentially non-elementarily large
automata from EREs. All one needs to do is to iteratively apply NFA-to-DFA
transformations for EREs under complement operators and then complement the
resulting DFAs (by complementing their final states). Since each NFA-to-DFA
transformation may lead to an exponential explosion on the number of states
and since the ERE can have arbitrarily many nested complement operators, the
resulting NFA or DFA can be non-elementarily larger than the original ERE.
As already mentioned above, if we allow complementation then we can easily
switch from an expression defining the bad prefixes of a safety property to one
defining its good prefixes, and backwards, by applying a complement operator.
Therefore, from here on, when we say that an ERE expresses a safety property,
without any loss of generality we assume that it defines the good prefixes of
the safety property; in particular, we assume that its language is prefix closed.
Clearly, if one can afford to generate an automaton from the ERE expressing
a safety property, then one can and probably should use that automaton as
a monitor for the safety property. However, since such an automaton can be
enormous compared to the the size of the original ERE, a natural question to
ask is whether one can generate monitors for safety properties expressed as EREs
that need less than non-elementary space in the size of the original ERE. We
next give a negative answer to this question.
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Let us first discuss our subsequent lower bound result from a more conceptual
perspective. Notice that synchronous monitoring, that is, the monitoring process
where an error is detected as soon as it appears, is harder than checking for satis-
fiability (or non-emptiness); indeed, if a formula in a particular formalism is not
satisfiable (or it has an empty language), then a synchronous monitor should
detect that before the first event is observed. We refer the interested reader
to [22] for a discussion on various types of monitoring, including synchronous
versus asynchronous monitoring. Synchronous monitors need to either directly
(e.g., by accumulating logical constraints while verifying their consistency) or
indirectly (e.g., by generating statically an automaton or a structure contain-
ing all possible future behaviors) check for satisfiability (or non-emptiness) of
the remaining requirements as events are observed online. Unfortunately, this
is an expensive process that may be desired to be avoided, at the expense of
delaying the detection of violations. For example, the rewriting based monitor-
ing approach for LTL in [22] delays the detection of violations of LTL formulae
of the form “(next ϕ) and (next ¬ϕ)” for one more event, to avoid invoking an
expensive satisfiability checker for LTL but to instead invoke a propositional sat-
isfiability checker which is less expensive in practice; this is closely related to the
notion of “informative prefixes” in [17] that “tell all the story”. Our subsequent
lower-bound result states that any monitor for safety properties expressed using
EREs, synchronous or asynchronous, requires non-elementary space.
Let us now clarify that our lower bound result is not a consequence of the
lower-bound result by Meyer and Stockmeyer in [29] (see [28] for a proof of
that result). A first reason is that neither the ERE constructed in [28, 29] nor
its complement is prefix closed. Indeed, we here focus on a subset of EREs,
rather than arbitrary EREs, namely those whose languages are prefix closed,
so they express good prefixes of safety properties. Supposing that one could
modify the “hard” ERE in [28, 29] whose complement non-emptiness requires
non-elementary space into one whose language is prefix-closed and whose size
is linear in the size of the original one, the fact that synchronous monitoring
of EREs is harder than checking for emptiness does not necessarily imply that
monitoring that hard ERE requires non-elementary space. In fact, monitoring
that particular ERE requires constant time to process each event, because it is
equivalent with an automaton of one state – it takes, however, non-elementary
space to compute that one state automaton. What it says is therefore that the
initialization step of ERE-safety synchronous monitoring requires, in the worst
case, non-elementary space.
Interestingly, if one could modify the results in [28, 29] to hold for prefix-
closed EREs, including especially the result stating that finding an RE equivalent
to an ERE is a non-elementary problem, then one could show that synchronous
monitoring of safety properties expressed as EREs requires non-elementary space!
Indeed, supposing that one had for any ERE a monitor that takes only elemen-
tary space in its worst-case monitoring scenario, then one could use that monitor
to generate a DFA for the ERE as follows: start with the initial state of the mon-
itor and then discover and store new states of the monitor by feeding arbitrary
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(but finite in number) events to each state of the monitor until no new state is
discovered. This closure operation takes as much time and space as the number
of states the monitor reach; since by assumption the monitor needs “only” el-
ementary space to store its state in any scenario, we deduce that the obtained
automaton has size elementary in the size of the ERE (and it also takes elemen-
tary time and space to generate it). In other words, we could find an elementary
algorithm to associate to any (prefix closed) ERE an equivalent RE, contra-
dicting the non-elementary lower bound in [28, 29] (again, supposing that the
lower-bound results in [28, 29] could be modified for prefix-closed EREs).
Unfortunately, it is not that clear how to reduce the non-elementary problems
in [28, 29] to asynchronous monitoring, and thus to conclude that asynchronous
monitoring also requires non-elementary space. That is because a “smart” asyn-
chronous monitor may in principle collapse states (when regarded as an au-
tomaton as in the construction above) in rather unexpected ways, just because
it “knows” that eventually an error may be reported anyway if observation con-
tinues indefinitely from that state on; in other words, states with the property
that “eventually violation detected in the future” may be collapsed as equivalent
by an asynchronous monitor. This way, the DFA extracted from a monitor for a
safety property expressed as an ERE may be significantly smaller than the DFA
corresponding to the ERE (and obviously, it may have a different language).
Our next result shows that asynchronous monitoring of ERE-safety also re-
quires non-elementary space, which is a more general lower-bound result than
the space non-elementarity of synchronous monitoring. Moreover, it gives an al-
ternative proof of the non-elementary lower-bounds by Stockmeyer and Meyer
[28, 29], because automata corresponding to safety-defining EREs are just spe-
cial cases of monitors, so they must also take non-elementary space. Moreover,
we improve the results in [28, 29] by showing that their lower-bounds also hold
for a subset of EREs, namely those corresponding to safety properties.
Summarizing the discussion above, we believe that the main contributions of
our subsequent lower-bound result are the following:
1. We show that asynchronous monitoring already requires non-elementary
space, same as synchronous monitoring. For example, an ERE monitoring
algorithm was presented by Ros¸u and Viswanathan in [23], which “rewrites”
or “derives” the ERE by each letter in the input word; the derivation process
consists of some straightforward rewrite rules, some for expanding the ERE
others for contracting it via simplifications. No comprehensive and expensive
check for emptiness on the resulting ERE is performed, except what is done
by the simplification rules (for example ∅·R→ ∅ and ·R→ R, etc.). A check
for emptiness can and should be eventually performed (for example, a check
for emptiness can be done periodically, say every 10x events for some conve-
nient x). This gives us an asynchronous ERE monitoring algorithm, which,
unlike the simplistic NFA/DFA generation algorithm, does not pay upfront
the potentially non-elementary worst-case penalty! However, our subsequent
lower bound result tells that there is a worst-case scenario in which one
cannot avoid the non-elementary space required to store the continuously
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changing ERE if one wants to correctly eventually detect violations of the
original ERE. And that is the case for any synchronous or asynchronous
monitoring algorithm for safety properties expressed as EREs.
2. We propose a different technique to prove non-elementary lower-bounds, fun-
damentally different from the one in [28]. The technique in [28] is based on di-
agonalization arguments and encodings of accepting Turing machine compu-
tations as finite trace words. Our technique is inspired from an idea by Chan-
dra, Kozen and Stockmeyer [6] introduced to show the power of alternation
and then used by several authors to prove exponential lower bounds [15, 16,
23, 22]. At our knowledge, the use of such a technique to show non-elementary
lower bounds is novel. The idea of the technique in [6] is to define expressions
having as languages Ln = {w(1)#w(2)# · · ·#w(k)$w | w(1), w(2), ..., w(k), w ∈
{0, 1}n, (∃1 ≤ i ≤ k) w(i) = w}. Our idea is to define, using EREs, words
of the form Xn$X ′n, where Xn and X
′
n are n-deep nested sets starting with
elements in {0, 1}n (i.e., sets of sets of ... of sets of elements in {0, 1}n, with
n power set operations), such that X ′n is n-nested included in Xn, where
i-nested inclusion is standard inclusion when i = 1 and, if i > 1, then it is
defined inductively as: X ′i is i-nested included in Xi iff for each X
′
i−1 ∈ X ′i,
there is some Xi−1 ∈ Xi such that X ′i−1 is (i− 1)-nested included in Xi−1.
One more observation is in place before we move on to the technical details. It
is known that the membership problem for EREs, testing whether a word w of size
m is in the language of an ERE of size n, is polynomial in m and n. For example,
the classic algorithm by Hopcroft and Ullman [13] runs in space O(m2 · n) and
time O(m3 · n); slightly improved algorithms have been proposed by several
authors [12, 31–33, 18, 14], reducing space requirements to O(m2 · k+m · n) and
time to O(m3·k+m2·n) or worse, where k is the number of complement operators
in the ERE; a recent ERE membership algorithm was proposed by the author in
[25], which runs in space O(m·logm·2n) and time O(m2 ·logm·2n) when m > 2n.
These algorithms appear to be efficient, because they are polynomial or simply
exponential in the ERE, so one may think that one may device an elementary
ERE-safety monitoring algorithm as follows: store the trace of events and at each
newly received event invoke one of these “efficient” ERE membership algorithms.
While this algorithm will indeed be elementary in the size of the ERE and the size
of the trace, our lower bound result says that it will, in fact, be non-elementary
in the size of only the ERE! In other words, for a carefully chosen “hard” ERE
of size n, there are finite traces of large enough size m so that checking their
membership is a problem which is non-elementary in n; this will indeed happen
when m is non-elementarily larger than n.
6.2 The Lower-Bound Result
EREs define languages by inductively applying union (+), concatenation (·),
Kleene Closure (?), intersection (∩), and complementation (¬). The language of
an ERE R, say L(R), is defined inductively as follows, where s ∈ Σ:
– L(∅) = ∅,
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– L() = {},
– L(s) = {s},
– L(R1 +R2) = L(R1) ∪ L(R2),
– L(R1 ·R2) = L(R1) · L(R2),
– L(R?) = (L(R))?,
– L(R1 ∩R2) = L(R1) ∩ L(R2),
– L(¬R) = ¬L(R).
If R does not contain ¬ and ∩ then it is a regular expression (RE). By applying
De Morgan’s law R1 ∩ R2 ≡ ¬(¬R1 + ¬R2), EREs can be linearly (in both
time and size) translated into equivalent EREs without intersection; therefore,
intersection of EREs is just syntactic sugar. The size of an ERE is the total
number of occurrences of letters and composition operators (+, ·, ?, and ¬)
that it contains. In what follows we assume that Σ is finite. For notational
simplicity, in what follows we let Σ also denote the RE s1 + s2 + · · ·+ sn where
Σ = {s1, s2, . . . , sn} and let Σ? denote both the language {s1, s2, . . . , sn}? and
the RE (s1 + s2 + · · ·+ sn)?.
For n ∈ N, let us define inductively the following alphabets and languages:
– Σ0 = {0, 1} and Ξ0 = {0, 1}n, and
– Σi = Σi−1∪{#i} and Ξi = {#i#i}∪({#i}·Ξi−1)+ ·{#i}, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
In the above, #i are n fresh letters. The intuition for the languages Ξi above
is to encode nested sets of depth i that contain sets of words of n bits at their
deepest level. The symbols #i play the role of markers separating the elements of
such sets. For example, the word #2#1#1#2#101#110#1#2#1#1#2 encodes
{{}, {01, 10}, {}}, that is, the set {{}, {01, 10}}; since the multiplicity and order
of elements in sets are irrelevant, the same set can have (infinitely) many differ-
ent encodings. Formally, let us define the following set functions associating to
encodings in Ξi corresponding nested sets:
– set0 :Ξ0 → {0, 1}n is the identity function on Ξ0, i.e., set0(w) = w;
– seti :Ξi → Pi({0, 1}n), where Pi is the power set operator applied i times,
seti(#i#i) = {}, seti(#iXi−1#i) = {seti−1(Xi−1)}, and seti(#iXi−1Xi) =
{seti−1(Xi−1)} ∪ seti(Xi), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Xi−1 ∈ Ξi−1, and Xi ∈ Ξi.
Note that |set0(Ξ0)| = 2n and seti(Ξi) = P(seti−1(Ξi−1)) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
therefore, |seti(Ξi)| = 22·
·2n
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, with i+1 nested power operations.
Let us define nested-inclusion relations Fi :Pi({0, 1}n) × Pi({0, 1}n) for
0 ≤ i ≤ n and nested-membership relations Ai :Pi−1({0, 1}n) × Pi({0, 1}n)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n as follows:
– F0 is the identity on {0, 1}n and F1 is ⊆ :P({0, 1}n)×P({0, 1}n),
– A1 is ∈ : {0, 1}n × P({0, 1}n), and for 1 < i,
– Si−1 A Si iff there is some S′i−1 ∈ Si such that Si−1 F S′i−1, and
– Si F S′i iff Si−1 A S′i for each Si−1 ∈ Si.
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For example, if n = 2 then {{00, 01}, {01, 10}, {11}} F2 {{00, 01, 10}, {00, 11}}
because {00, 01}, {01, 10} F1 {00, 01, 10} and {11} F1 {00, 11}.
We can now define Σ as Σn ∪{$} and the infinite trace property Pωn over Σ:
( ∪ (Σ∗n ∪ {Xn$X ′n | Xn, X ′n ∈ Ξn and setn(X ′n) Fn setn(Xn)}) · {$}) ·Σωn .
An infinite trace in Pωn therefore contains at most two $ letters and infinitely
many letters in Σn. There are no restrictions on the appearance of the letters
in Σn when there is no $ letter or when there is precisely one $ letter. However,
if the infinite trace contains precisely two $ letters, that is, if it has the form
w$w′$u for some w,w′ ∈ Σ?n and some u ∈ Σωn , then w and w′ must be in
Ξn and the nested set corresponding to w must nested-include the nested set
corresponding to w′; there are no restrictions on u.
Proposition 15. Pωn ∈ Safetyω.
Proof. There are two cases to analyze for an infinite trace that is not in Pωn : when
it contains more than two $ letter, or when it has the form w$w′$u with w,w′ ∈
Σ?n and u ∈ Σωn , but it is not the case that w,w′ ∈ Ξn and setn(w′) Fn setn(w).
In the first case, we can pick the first prefix of the infinite trace containing three
$ letters in total; clearly, this finite trace prefix cannot be continued into any
acceptable infinite trace. In the second case, since there are no restrictions on
the letters in u, we can easily see that the prefix w$w′$ is already a violation
threshold: there is no u′ ∈ Σωn such that w$w′$u′ ∈ Pωn .
The bijection in the proof of Theorem 2 associates to each infinite-trace safety
property a persistent finite-trace safety property by taking its prefixes. Let Pn
be the persistent finite-trace safety property prefixes(Pωn ) corresponding to P
ω
n .
It is easy to see that Pn is the property
Σ?n
⋃
Σ?n · {$} ·Σ?n
⋃
{Xn$X ′n | Xn, X ′n ∈ Ξn and setn(X ′n) Fn setn(Xn)} · {$} ·Σ?n.
Note that monitoring Pωn is the same as monitoring Pn: in both cases, besides
the capability to checking whether there are more than two $ letters, which
is trivial, the monitor needs to store sufficient information about the nested set
corresponding to Xn, so that, when the first $ is seen, to be able to check whether
it nested-includes the set corresponding to the upcoming, yet unknown X ′n.
Theorem 6. Any synchronous or asynchronous monitor for Pn or Pωn needs
space non-elementary in n, namely Ω(22
··2
n
), with n nested power operations.
Proof. Suppose that M is a monitor for Pn or Pωn and suppose that, during
a monitoring session, it reads the prefix Xn ∈ Ξn. Regardless of how M is
defined or implemented, in particular regardless of whether it reports violations
synchronously or asynchronously, when the first $ event is encountered, the state
of M must contain enough information to sooner or later be able to decide
whether the set setn(X ′n) corresponding to any upcoming (unknown at the time
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the $ is observed) sequence X ′n is nested-included in setn(Xn). Since set(X
′
n) can
in particular be equal to setn(Xn), and since once the second $ event is observed
there is no further event that may bring new knowledge to the monitor, we
deduce that M must be able to distinguish any two different sets in setn(Ξn)
when the first $ event is encountered, that is, M ’s states must be different after
reading words in Ξn whose corresponding nested sets are different. Therefore,
M must be able to distinguish |setn(Ξn)| different possibilities. Since one needs
Ω(logN) space to distinguish among N different situations (one label for each),
we conclude that M needs space Ω(log(|setn(Ξn)|)), that is, Ω(22·
·2n
) with n
nested power operations. Hence, any monitor for Pn needs non-elementarily large
space in n.
We next show how to construct an ERE polynomial in size with n whose
language is precisely Pn.
Theorem 7. There is an ERE of size O(n3) whose language is Pn.
Proof. Note that Pn is a union of three languages, the first two being trivial to
express as languages of corresponding REs. As expected, the difficult part is to
associate an ERE to the language
{Xn$X ′n | Xn, X ′n ∈ Ξn and setn(X ′n) Fn setn(Xn)}.
Note that so far we did not need complementation. The property above can,
however, be expressed as an ERE of size O(n3) using O(n) nested complement
operators. The idea is to define iteratively a sequence of EREs Ki for 0 ≤ 1 ≤ n
whose languages contain words Xiw$w′X ′i with seti(X
′
i) Fi set(Xi), which are
contiguous fragments of desired words Xn$X ′n. Then Kn would be the language
that we are looking for. To define Ki, we observe that the nested-inclusion S′i Fi
Si is equivalent to: there is no S′i−1 ∈ S′i such that it is not the case that we
can find some Si−1 ∈ Si such that S′i−1 Fi−1 Si−1. This crucial observation will
allow us to define Ki in terms of Ki−1. We next develop the technical details.
Let us first define regular patterns corresponding to each of the languages
Ξi for 0 ≤ i ≤ n; to avoid introducing new names, we ambiguously let the
corresponding regular expressions have the same names as their languages:
– Let Ξ0 = (0 + 1)n, where for an RE, rn is r · r · . . . · r (n times); and
– Let Ξi = #i ·#i + (#i ·Ξi−1)+ ·#i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Iteratively eliminating the Ξi−1 regular expressions from the right-hand-sides,
we eventually obtain n + 1 regular patters, each of size O(n) (the size of Ξ0 as
a regular expression is O(n) and each Ξi adds a constant size to that of Ξi−1).
Next we define REs for the languages prefixes(Ξi) and suffixes(Ξi) of prefixes
and respectively suffixes of words in Ξi, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n. We only discuss the
prefix closure languages; the suffix closures are dual. The prefix closures can be





– prefixes(Ξi) = {,#i#i}
⋃ {#i} · prefixes(Ξi−1)⋃({#i} · Ξi−1)+⋃ ({#i} ·
Ξi−1)+ · {#i} · prefixes(Ξi−1)
= {#i#i}
⋃
({#i} ·Ξi−1)? · ({}
⋃ {#i} · prefixes(Ξi−1)).
These languages can be expressed with the following REs; as before, we ambigu-
ously use the same names for the corresponding REs:
– Let prefixes(Ξ0) = + (0 + 1) + (0 + 1)2 + · · ·+ (0 + 1)n = (+ 0 + 1)n; and
– Let prefixes(Ξi) = #i ·#i + (#i ·Ξi−1)? · (+ #i · prefixes(Ξi−1)).
Iteratively eliminating the REs prefixes(Ξi−1) from the right-hand-sides, we even-
tually obtain n+ 1 REs, each of size O(i2 +n) (the size of prefixes(Ξ0) as an RE
is O(n) and each prefixes(Ξi) adds size O(i) to that of prefixes(Ξi−1)). Dually,
– Let suffixes(Ξ0) = + (0 + 1) + (0 + 1)2 + · · ·+ (0 + 1)n = (+ 0 + 1)n; and
– Let suffixes(Ξi) = #i ·#i + (+ suffixes(Ξi−1) ·#i) · (Ξi−1 ·#i)?.
We next define REs Li and Ri for 0 ≤ i ≤ n whose languages contain the
contiguous fragments of words in Ξn that are allowed to appear to the left and
to the right of $, respectively, so that words in L(Li) start with #i and words
in L(Ri) end with #i. Let us also assume by convention that Ln+1 = Rn+1 = 
(the RE whose language contains only the empty word). It is easy to see that
Li and Ri can be defined as follows:
– Let Li = #i ·Σ?n ∩ suffixes(Ξn), and
– Let Ri = Σ?n ·#i ∩ prefixes(Ξn).
Note that words in Li and Ri may not necessarily start or end with a word in
Ξi: indeed, the #i that may start or end Li or Ri could very well be followed or
preceded, respectively, by a #i+1 or, if i = n, by $.
Let us also define the EREs Li and Ri whose languages are included in those
of Li and Ri, respectively, and whose words start or end with words in Ξi:
– Let Li = Ξi ·Σ∗n ∩ suffixes(Ξn), and
– Let Ri = Σ∗n ·Ξi ∩ prefixes(Ξn).
It is not difficult to see that Li = Ξi · Li+1 and Ri = Ri+1 · Ξi. Note that the
sizes of Li, Ri, Li and Ri are O(n2).
Let us now define the EREs Ki for 0 ≤ i ≤ n as follows:




0 · 0 ·Σ? · 0 ·Σn−k−10 +Σk0 · 1 ·Σ? · 1 ·Σn−k−10 ), and
– Ki = Li ·$ ·Ri∩¬((¬((#i ·Ξi−1)? ·#i ·Ki−1)∩Li ·$ ·Ri−1) ·(#i ·Ξi−1)? ·#i).
We next show by induction on i that L(Ki) is the language
{XiwX ′i | Xi, X ′i ∈ Ξi, w ∈ L(Li+1 · $ ·Ri+1), seti(X ′i) Fi seti(Xi)}.
It is easy to see that L(K0) = {X0wX0 | X0 ∈ Ξ0, w ∈ L(L1 ·$ ·R1), because the
large conjunct in K0 states that the words formed with the first n letters and
with the last ones, respectively, are equal and in Ξ0, and because L0 · $ · R0 =
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Ξ0 · L1 · $ ·R1 ·Ξ0 and F0 is the identity on {0, 1}n. For the inductive step, let
us now assume that for some arbitrary 1 ≤ i < n, L(Ki−1) is the language
{Xi−1wX ′i−1 |Xi−1, X ′i−1 ∈ Ξi−1, w ∈ L(Li·$·Ri), seti−1(X ′i−1) Fi−1 seti−1(Xi−1)}.
Then we can easily show that L((#i ·Ξi−1)? ·#i ·Ki−1) is the language
{XiwX ′i−1 |Xi ∈ Ξi, X ′i−1 ∈ Ξi−1, w ∈ L(Li+1·$·Ri), seti−1(X ′i−1) Ai−1 seti(Xi)}.
Then we can show that L(¬((#i ·Ξi−1)? ·#i ·Ki−1) ∩ Li · $ ·Ri−1) is
{XiwX ′i−1 |Xi ∈ Ξi, X ′i−1 ∈ Ξi−1, w ∈ L(Li+1·$·Ri), seti−1(X ′i−1) 6Ai−1 seti(Xi)}.
Now we can show that L((¬((#i ·Ξi−1)? ·#i ·Ki−1)∩Li ·$·Ri−1)·(#i ·Ξi−1)? ·#i)
is the language
{XiwX ′i | Xi, X ′i ∈ Ξi, w ∈ L(Li+1 · $ ·Ri+1), seti(X ′i) 6Fi−1 seti(Xi)}.
Finally, we are now able to show that L(Ki), that is,
L(Li · $ ·Ri ∩ ¬((¬((#i ·Ξi−1)? ·#i ·Ki−1) ∩ Li · $ ·Ri−1) · (#i ·Ξi−1)? ·#i))
is the language
{XiwX ′i | Xi, X ′i ∈ Ξi, w ∈ L(Li+1 · $ ·Ri+1), seti(X ′i) Fi seti(Xi)}.
Since Ln+1 = Rn+1 = , it follows that
L(Kn) = {Xn$X ′n | Xn, X ′n ∈ Ξn, seti(X ′i) Fi seti(Xi)}.
The size of Kn is O(n3).
We can now show that the language of the ERE of size O(n3)
(+ (Σ?n +Kn) · $) ·Σ?n
is indeed Pn.
We can now formulate our space lower-bound result for monitoring ERE-
safety as a corollary of the two results above.
Corollary 1. For any n ∈ N, there is some safety property whose good prefixes
are precisely the words in the language of an ERE of size O(n) and whose moni-
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38
8 Optimal Monitoring of “Always Past” Temporal Safety
A monitor synthesis algorithm from linear temporal logic (LTL) safety formulae
of the form ϕ where ϕ is a past time LTL formula was presented in [11]. The
generated monitors implemented the recursive semantics of past-time LTL using
a dynamic programming technique, and needed O(|ϕ|) time to process each new
event and O(|ϕ|) total space. Some compiler-like optimizations of the generated
monitors were also proposed in [11], which would further reduce the required
space. It is not clear how much the required space could be reduced by applying
those optimizations.
We here show how to generate using a divide-and-conquer technique directly
monitors that need O(k) space and still O(|ϕ|) time, where k is the number of
temporal operators in ϕ.
8.1 The Monitor Synthesis Algorithm
For simplicity, we assume only two past operators, namely ◦· (previously) and
S (since). Let us first note that one cannot asymptotically reduce the space
requirements below Ω(k), where k is the number of temporal operators appearing
in the formula to monitor ϕ. Indeed, one can take ϕ = (#1 → t1)∧ · · · ∧ (#k →
tk), where for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k, #i is some event and ti is some temporal formula
containing precisely one past temporal operator, i.e., a ◦· or a S . Any monitor
for ϕ must directly or indirectly store the status of each ti at every event, to be
able to react accordingly in case the next event is some #i. Assuming that the
events #i are distinct and that the formulae ti are unrelated, then the monitor
needs to distinguish among 2k possible states, so it needs Ω(k) space.
In what follows, we assume the usual recursive semantics of LTL, also pre-
sented below, restricted to safety formulae of the form ϕ, where ϕ is a past-time
LTL. We adopt the simplifying assumption that the empty trace invalidates any
atomic proposition and any past temporal operator; as argued in [11], this may
not always be the best choice, but other semantic variations regarding the empty
trace present no difficulties for monitoring.
Definition 22. (adapted from [21]) LTL formulae of the form ϕ (read “always
ϕ”), where ϕ is a past-time LTL formula, are called LTL safety formulae; we
may call them just safety formulae when LTL is understood from the context.
An infinite trace u ∈ Σω satisfies ϕ, written u |= ϕ, iff each w ∈ prefixes(u)
satisfies the past-time LTL formula ϕ, written also w |= ϕ and defined inductively
as follows:
w |= true is always true,
ws |= a iff a(s) holds,
w |= ¬ϕ iff w 6|= ϕ,
w |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff w |= ϕ1 and w |= ϕ2,
ws |= ◦·ϕ iff w |= ϕ,
ws |= ϕ1 S ϕ2 iff ws |= ϕ2 or ws |= Fϕ and w |= ϕ1 S ϕ2
 |= ϕ is false otherwise
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Given safety formula ϕ, we let L(ϕ) ⊆ Σω be the set {u ∈ Σω | u |= ϕ}.
Proposition 16. L(ϕ) ∈ Safetyω for any past-time LTL formula ϕ.
Proof. By the definition of L(ϕ) in Definition 22 and the definition of P in
Definition 10, one can easily note that L(ϕ) = L(ϕ), where L(ϕ) = {w ∈
Σ? | w |= ϕ}. Therefore, L(ϕ) ∈ Safetyω. The rest follows by Theorem 4.
Let us next investigate the problem of monitoring safety properties P ∈
Safetyω expressed as languages of safety formulae, that is, P = L(ϕ) for some
past-time LTL formula ϕ. Because of the recursive nature of the satisfaction re-
lation, a first important observation is that the generated monitor only needs to
store information regarding the status of temporal operators from the previous
state. More precisely, the monitor needs one bit per temporal operator, keeping
the satisfaction status of the subformula corresponding to that temporal op-
erator; when a new state is received, the satisfaction status of the subformula
is recalculated according to the recursive semantics above and then the bit is
updated. The order in which the temporal operators are processed when a new
state is received is important: the nested operators must be processed first.
We next present the actual monitor synthesis algorithm at a high-level. We
refrain from giving detailed pseudocode as we did in [11], because different ap-
plications may choose different implementation paradigms. For example, we are
currently using rewriting techniques to implement the monitor synthesis algo-
rithms in MOP [7]; Section 8.2 shows our complete Maude rewriting implemen-
tation of the subsequent monitor synthesis algorithm.
Step 1 Let ϕ1, ..., ϕk be the k subformulae of ϕ corresponding to temporal
operators, such that, if ϕi is a subformula of ϕj , then i < j; this can be
easily achieved by a DFS traversal of ϕ.
Step 2 Let bit[1..k] be a vector of k bits initialized to 0 (or false); bit[i] will
store information related to ϕi from the previous state:
– if ϕi = ◦·ψ then bit[i] says if ψ was satisfied at the previous state;
– if ϕi = ψ S ψ′ then bit[i] says if ϕi was satisfied at the previous step.
Step 3 Let bit′[1..k] be another vector of k bits; this will be used to store tem-
porary results, which will be moved eventually into the vector bit[1..k].
Step 4 Generate a loop that executes whenever a new state s is available; the
body of the loop executes the following code:
Step 4.1 For each i from 1 to k execute a bit assignment as follows, where
for a subformula ψ of ϕ, ψ is the boolean expression replacing in ψ
each non-nested temporal subformula ϕj by bit[j] if ϕj is a “previously”
formula or by bit′[j] if ϕj is a “since” formula, and each remaining atomic
proposition a by its satisfaction in the current state, a(s):
– if ϕi = ◦·ψ then generate the assignment bit′[i] := ψ
– if ϕi = ψ S ψ′ then generate the assignment bit′[i] := ψ′ ∨ ψ ∧ bit[i]
Step 4.2 Generate the conditional: if ϕ is false then error (formula violated)
Step 4.3 Generate code to move the contents of bit′[1..k] into bit[1..k].
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Note that the generated monitors are well-defined, because each time a ψ boolean
expression is generated, all the bits in bit′[1..k] that are needed are already
calculated. One can also perform boolean simplifications when calculating ψ
to reduce runtime overhead even further. For example, in our implementation
that also generated the code below (see Section 8.2), we used the simplification
¬¬ψ = ψ. To illustrate the monitor generation algorithm above, let us consider
the past time LTL formula: ϕ = ¬(a ∧ ¬(◦· b ∧ (c S (d ∧ (¬e S f))))). Step 1
produces the following enumeration of ϕ’s subformulae: ϕ1 = ◦· b, ϕ2 = ¬e S f ,
and ϕ3 = c S (d ∧ (¬e S f)). The other steps eventually generate the code:
bit[1..3] := false; // three global bits
foreach new state s do {
// first update the bits in a consistent order
bit′[1] := b(s);
bit′[2] := f(s) ∨ (¬e(s) ∧ bit[2]);
bit′[3] := d(s) ∧ bit′[2]) ∨ (c(s) ∧ bit[3]);
// then check whether the formula is violated
if a(s) ∧ ¬(bit[1] ∧ bit′[3]) then Error;
// finally, update the state of the monitor
bit[1..3] := bit′[1..3]
}
It is easy to see that for any past LTL formula ϕ of k temporal operators, the
state of the generated monitor is encoded on k bits, namely the vector bit[1..k].
The runtime of the generated monitor is still O(|ϕ|), because each temporal
operator in ϕ results in an assignment and a read operation in the monitor,
while each boolean operator in ϕ is “executed” by the monitor.
8.2 A Maude Implementation of the Monitor Synthesizer
We here show a term rewriting implementation of the algorithm above, using
the Maude system [8]. Implementations in other languages are obviously also
possible; however, rewriting proved to be an elegant means to generate monitors
from logical formulae in several other contexts, and so seems to be here. In what
follows we show the complete Maude code that takes as input a formula, parses
it, generates the monitor, and then pretty prints it. We use the K technique here
[24], which is a rewriting-based language and/or logic definitional technique; to
use K, one needs to first upload the generic, i.e., application-independent, module
discussed at the end of this section.
Atomic Predicates We start by defining the atomic state predicates that one
can use in formulae. These can be either identifiers (of the form ’a, ’abc, ’a123,
etc.; these are provided by the Maude builtin module QID):
fmod PREDICATE is




subsort Qid < Predicate .
endfm
Syntax of Formulae Let us next define the syntax of formulae. We here use
Maude’s mixfix notation for defining syntax as algebraic operators, where un-
derscores stay for arguments. Also, note that operators are assigned precedences
(declared as operator attributes), to relive the user from writing parentheses (the




subsort Predicate < Formula .
op !_ : Formula -> Formula [prec 20] .
op _/\_ : Formula Formula -> Formula [prec 23] .
op O_ : Formula -> Formula [prec 21] .
op _S_ : Formula Formula -> Formula [prec 22] .
endfm
Target Language We are done with the input language. Let us now define
the output language. We need a very simple language for implementing the gen-
erated monitors, namely one with limited assignment, conditional and looping.
The generated code, as well as the target language, play no role in this paper;
one is expected to change the language below to one’s desired target language
(Java, C, C#, assembler, etc.). Our chosen language below has bits, expressions,
statements and code. Bits are also expressions; code is a list of statements com-
posed sequentially using “;” or just concatenation. The syntax below is also
making use of precedence attributes. The format attributes are useful solely for
pretty-printing reasons (see Maude’s manual [8] for details on formatting):
fmod CODE is
--- syntax for the generated code
protecting PREDICATE + INT + STRING .
sorts Bit Exp Statement Code .
subsorts Bit < Exp .
subsort Statement < Code .
ops (bit[_]) (bit’[_]) : Nat -> Bit .
ops (bit[1 .. _]) (bit’[1 .. _]) : Int -> Bit .
op _(s) : Predicate -> Exp [prec 0] .
ops true false : -> Exp .
op !_ : Exp -> Exp [prec 20] .
op _/\_ : Exp Exp -> Exp [prec 23] .
op _\/_ : Exp Exp -> Exp [prec 24] .
op _:=_ : Exp Exp -> Statement [prec 27 format(ni d d d)] .
op if_then_ : Exp Statement -> Statement
[format(ni d d ++ --) prec 30] .
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op foreach new state s do _ : Code -> Statement
[format(n d d d d s++ --n)] .
op Error : -> Statement [format(ni d)] .
op //_ : String -> Statement [format(ni d d)] .
op nil : -> Code .
op _;_ : Code Code -> Code [assoc id: nil prec 40] .
op __ : Code Code -> Code [assoc id: nil prec 40] .
op {_} : Code -> Statement [format(d d --ni ++)] .
--- code simplification rules
var B : Exp .
eq ! ! B = B .
endfm
The following module defines the actual monitor synthesis algorithm. We use
the K definitional technique here, because it yields a very compact implemen-
tation. K is centered on the basic intuition of computation; computations are
encoded as first-order data-structures that “evolve”, via rewriting, to results.
Computations are sequentialized using the list constructor “ -> ”; thus, if K and
K’ are computations, then K -> K’ is the computation consisting of K followed
by K’. Computations may eventually yield results; for example, K -> K’ may
rewrite (in context) to R -> K’, meaning that R is the result that K reduces to.
An important feature of K is that one can schedule lists of tasks for reduction; for
example, [K1,K2,K3] -> K may eventually reduce to [R1,R2,R3] -> K, where
R1, R2, and R3 are the results that K1, K2, and K3 reduce to, in this order. To
use K, one needs to import the module K discussed at the and of this section.
The equations of the module K (three in total) are all about reducing a list of
computations to a list of results, supposing that one knows how to reduce one
computation to one result.
K is a definitional framework that is generic in computations and results.
More precisely, it provides sorts KComputation and KResult, and expects its
user to define the desired computations and results, as well as rules to reduce
a computation to a result. Computations typically can be reduced to results
only in context; to facilitate this, K provides a sort KConfiguration, which is
also supposed to be populated accordingly. The sort KConfiguration is a multi-
set sort over a sort KConfigurationItem, where the multi-set constructor is just
concatenation; also, the sort KComputation is a list sort over KComputationItem,
where the list constructor is -> . To make use of K, one needs to first define con-
structors for the sorts KConfigurationItem, KComputationItem and KResult,
and then to define how each computation item reduces to a result.
In our case, the computations are the formulae or subformulae that still need
to be processed, and the results are the corresponding boolean expressions that
need to be checked in the current (generated code) context to see whether the
formula has been violated or not. We define the following additional constructors:
we add four constructors for configurations, namely “k” that wraps the current
computation, “code” that wraps the current generated code, and “nextBit”
that wraps the next available bit; we add one main constructor for computations,
“form”, that wraps a formula, and one constant computation item per operator
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in the input language (the later is needed to know how to combine back the
results of the corresponding subexpressions; finally, we add one constructor for
results, “exp”, that wraps a boolean expression.
The formula is processed in a depth-first-order, following a divide-and-conquer
philosophy. Each subformula is decomposed into a list of computation sub-
tasks consisting of its subformulae, then the corresponding results are composed
back into a result corresponding to the original subformula. Recall that equa-
tions/rules apply wherever they match, not only at the top. Let us only discuss
the two equations defining the “since” ( S ), the last two in the module below.
The first one is straightforward: it decomposes the task of processing F1 S F2
to the subtasks of processing F1 and F2; the computation item S is placed in the
computation structure to prepare the terrain for the next equation. The next
equation applies after F1 and F2 have been processed, say to expressions B1 and
B2, respectively; if C is the code generated so far and if I+1 is the next bit avail-
able, then the boolean expression corresponding to the current since formula is
indeed bit’(I+1), provided that one adds the corresponding code capturing the
recursive semantics of since to the generated code.
fmod MONITOR-GENERATION is
protecting K + SYNTAX + CODE .
op k : KComputation -> KConfigurationItem .
op code : Code -> KConfigurationItem .
op nextBit : Nat -> KConfigurationItem .
op process : Formula -> KConfiguration .
op form : Formula -> KComputationItem .
op exp : Exp -> KResult .
ops ! /\ O S : -> KComputationItem .
var P : Predicate . vars F F1 F2 : Formula . var C : Code .
var I : Nat . vars B B1 B2 : Exp . var K : KComputation .
eq process(F) = k(form(F)) code(nil) nextBit(0) .
eq k(form(P) -> K) = k(exp(P(s)) -> K) .
eq form(! F) = form(F) -> ! .
eq exp(B) -> ! = exp(! B) .
eq form(F1 /\ F2) = [form(F1),form(F2)] -> /\ .
eq [exp(B1),exp(B2)] -> /\ = exp(B1 /\ B2) .
eq form(O F) = form(F) -> O .
eq k(exp(B) -> O -> K) code(C) nextBit(I)
= k(exp(bit[I + 1]) -> K) code(C ; bit’[I + 1] := B)
nextBit(I + 1) .
eq form(F1 S F2) = [form(F1), form(F2)] -> S .
eq k([exp(B1),exp(B2)] -> S -> K) code(C) nextBit(I)
= k(exp(bit’[I + 1]) -> K)
code(C ; bit’[I + 1] := B2 \/ B1 /\ bit[I + 1]) nextBit(I + 1) .
endfm
Putting It All together The following module plugs the code generated above





op genMonitor : Formula -> Code .
op makeMonitor : KConfiguration -> Code .
var F : Formula . var B : Exp . var C : Code . vars N M : Nat .
eq genMonitor(F) = makeMonitor(process(F)) .
eq makeMonitor(k(exp(B)) code(C) nextBit(N))
= bit[1 .. N] := false ;
foreach new state s do {
// "first update the bits in a consistent order"
C ;
// "then check whether the formula is violated"
if !(B) then Error ;
// "finally, update the state of the monitor"
bit[1 .. N] := bit’[1 .. N]
} .
endfm
Our implementation of the monitor synthesizer is now complete. To use it,
one can ask Maude reduce terms of the form genMonitor(F), where F is the
formula that one wants to generate into a monitor. For example:
reduce genMonitor(
!(’a /\ !(O ’b /\ ’c S (’d /\ (! ’e S ’f))))
) .
For the formula above, Maude will give the expected answer, pretty printed
as follows:
\||||||||||||||||||/
--- Welcome to Maude ---
/||||||||||||||||||\
Maude 2.2 built: Mar 15 2006 16:37:22
Copyright 1997-2005 SRI International
















reduce in PRETTY-PRINT :
genMonitor(! (’a /\ ! (O ’b /\ ’c S (’d /\ ! ’e S ’f)))) .
rewrites: 46 in -93406740ms cpu (1ms real) (~ rewrites/second)
result Code:
bit[1 .. 3] := false ;
foreach new state s do {
// "first update the bits in a consistent order"
bit’[1] := ’b(s) ;
bit’[2] := ’f(s) \/ ! ’e(s) /\ bit[2] ;
bit’[3] := ’d(s) /\ bit’[2] \/ ’c(s) /\ bit[3] ;
// "then check whether the formula is violated"
if ’a(s) /\ ! (bit[1] /\ bit’[3]) then
Error ;
// "finally, update the state of the monitor"
bit[1 .. 3] := bit’[1 .. 3]
}
Maude>
The K Module One should upload the next module whenever one wants to
use the K technique to define a language, logic or tool. Note that the module
below has nothing to do with our particular logic under consideration in this
paper; that is the reason for which we exiled it here.
fmod K is
sorts KConfigurationItem KConfiguration .
subsort KConfigurationItem < KConfiguration .
op empty : -> KConfiguration .
op __ : KConfiguration KConfiguration -> KConfiguration [assoc comm id: empty] .
sorts KComputationItem KNeComputation KComputation .
subsort KComputationItem < KNeComputation < KComputation .
op nil : -> KComputation .
op _->_ : KComputation KComputation -> KComputation [assoc id: nil] .
op _->_ : KNeComputation KNeComputation -> KNeComputation [ditto] .
sort KComputationList .
subsort KComputation < KComputationList .
op nil : -> KComputationList .
op _,_ : KComputationList KComputationList -> KComputationList [assoc id: nil] .
sort KResult KResultList .
subsorts KResult < KResultList < KComputation .
op nil : -> KResultList .
op _,_ : KResultList KResultList -> KResultList [assoc id: nil] .
op [_] : KComputationList -> KComputationItem .
op [_] : KResultList -> KComputationItem .
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op [_|_] : KComputationList KResultList -> KComputationItem .
var K : KNeComputation . var Kl : KComputationList .
var R : KResult . var Rl : KResultList .
eq [K,Kl] = K -> [Kl | nil] .
eq R -> [K,Kl | Rl] = K -> [Kl | Rl,R] .
eq R -> [nil | Rl] = [Rl,R] .
endfm
To use K, after importing the module above, one should define one’s own con-
structors for configuration items (sort KConfigurationItem), for computation
items (sort KComputationItem), and for results (sort KResult). For our example,
we defined all these at the beginning of the module MONITOR-GENERATION.
9 Conclusion
In this paper we made the following contributions:
1. by showing that their sets have the same cardinal, we showed that various
definitions of safety properties over finite, infinite, or both finite and infinite
traces considered in the literature are equivalent;
2. we introduced persistent (finite-trace) safety properties and showed their
one-to-one correspondence with the infinite trace safety properties;
3. we showed that all safety properties can be characterized as “always past”
properties, that is, as properties that their prefixes must always satisfy;
4. we showed that monitoring safety properties is an arbitrarily hard problem;
5. we showed that the problem of monitoring safety properties expressed as
extended regular expressions requires non-elementary space; and
6. we gave an optimal monitor synthesis algorithm for past LTL.
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